CAMEROON: LIVING ON THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO

The eruption of democracy and its enemies

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Douala 1999 & Bonn 2000
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All illustrations: Schott, Caspar; Physica curiosa, sive mirabilia naturae et artis libris XII. comprehensa, quibus pleraque, quae de Angelis, Daemonibus, hominribus, Spectris, Eneumenis, Monstris, Portentis, Animalibus, Meteoris; Würzburg 1667.

Preface

According to the poet, W. H. Auden, for a nation to achieve perfection we must love one another, or die.

Though Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau's scholarship is impenetrable, even sometimes grotesquely pedantic - yet, there is pity for a society whose leadership is the exemplar of bizarre contradictions - the author concerns himself with many spheres of Cameroonian life.

Removing the cankerworm of looting and venality galore may be a mission impossible. But she (Cameroons) will, survive.

Understand this ladies and gentlemen: This is therefore not a book for the timid or weak of heart.

This is not a springboard for the naive and the chauvinist.

Here the myths of race and racism tend not to deny the author's individuality or, stifle his potential as debunker and pessimistic sceptic. But, even that too can be mercifully forgotten.

The enduring quality of Dr. Schmidt-Soltau's scholarship might be found in his intelligent and methodical recourse to Marxian theoretical postulates and paradigms as opposed to relativism, subjectivism, and bourgeois dislocation of concrete reality. More on this, shortly.

A basilica of criminal folly, outlandish feats and self-apotheosis is the chaos called Kamerun. The psychosis of its home-grown Herrn Führer runs, deep.

Why should we expect anything from such sanctimonious skunks? Of someone who is a product of a wholly degenerated and, mongrelised institution?
Let the celebrated skunks of such a behemoth say goodbye to internal cohesion and external peace keeping. See how they work under clever and complex ways in milking the system to their advantage!

Though his turgid, heavily accented prose style might not often be vivid and fluent, the author has, written, excellent, short and penetrating pieces of the life of the Cameroonian comprador bourgeoisie: Splendid in their Brechtian characterisation. If we apprehend, the fugue atmosphere of nation; breathing the hubris of the tragic bard, Vladimir Mayakovsky's (1894-1930), sirens of anagnorisis:

"... the ship of poetry
broken
against he rock of state ..."

His ring-side knowledge of Jesco von Puttkamer's hidden colonial agenda seems to have, in many ways, bred in Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau a haughty and, almost aristocratic aloofness and razor-sharp wit which he does not hesitate to apply to fakes and phonies.

Perhaps, too, his prejudices help to make his book readable, since, this also seems to suit the mood of the times.

However, Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau's revelations and their fall-outs did not often sit well with the targets of his darts, resulting, in mounting opposition and rejection. Pause. The systematic doctrines that spawned socialism and communism came in the writing of that primary commentator of political economics, culture and history, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Engels.

Marx's tomes portray him as a thorough going materialist scholar whose mind marks a turning point against the epistemological positions among early 19th century German idealists though Sir Karl Raimund Popper, Professor of Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics for many years, taught the world the virtue of being wrong and carried out in his research the effective demolition of the philosophical thrust of Marxism.

But, orthodox Marxism has also been pilloried for being just another Aryan myth of white supremacist ideology that is in spite of its professed concern with class, race, sex, with oppressions and liberation struggles of peoples of the so-called Third World.

In fact, writing in the much-lamented Alioune Diop's venerated quarterly, Presence Africaine, the Ghanaian writer, Ayi Kwei Armah, in "Masks and Marx: The Marxist Ethos vis-à-vis African Revolutionary Theory and Praxis" has been at the forefront of the attack against the Eurocentric notion of Marxist philosophy in its linear conception of history; its autotelic technology and its implicit belief in the stupidity of the peasantry.

In providing a most vigorous and Afrocentric articulation of orthodox Marxist sociology's flaws, Kweii Armah, according to Dr. Chidi Amuta, arrives at the conclusion that Marxism is "a part of the African vogue in worshipping Western products."

However, Communist Manifesto and Kapital emphasise, the need for cultural artefacts to reflect the class struggle since the scientific scrutiny of history inevitably must repeal "an undeviating, evolutionary, dialectic process ... the inevitable fusion of history thus becomes the succession of class struggle" (Hazard Adams; Critical Theory since Plato: 1971;58).

Why does sycophancy yield such huge dividends in the drizzling farce that is the Central African sub-region?

Answer: People of principles are few and are not in the system(s). The process of exorcising from our individual nation psyches, loquacious cohorts, mutant-scions and other self-serving opportunists
who ride on the back of the masses to achieve recognition and credibility is not going to be an easy task.

The political rigmarole is over. In graphic details - the looting of the Commonwealth - is exposed. For - according to Herbert Marcuse (Essay on Liberation; London; 1972) - revolution is a seminal thing, a biological need. It is Truth Universal, uncommoditized.

Diversity being an essential element of credibility, this scholar goes directly at the corrupt heart of our ghommid visions, driving a scimitar through its dungeon of lies, woven by the Champs d’Elysée and its stooge Africa for Africanists ...

Specialising in the teaching of sociology and anthropology in an African university makes one a rebel by profession.

Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau could have unashamedly declared, like his old anti-Christ mentor that "the problem of scientific research into society consists of the explanation of those particular historical laws which regulate the origin, existence, development and decline of any given social organism, and its transformation into another, superior one." (Rius: Marx for Beginners; p. 160)

An academic, in the mould of the old Doktor Karl who succeeds them in raising Sociology by demonstrating that the development of society is not "solely determined by ideas but by the relation of production" is bound to clash with the gods that be.

He will be accused of political blasphemy. He will suffer ignominy. And expulsion.

Dr. Schmidt-Soltau excels as a social critic, debunker and as an analyser of Cameroon society and social realities.

His column in The Post engendered the feeling that contemporary Cameroonian society with its infrastructural decay and augean dementia is one of the saddest and most tragic countries in the world. This often gives rise to a deep and often bitter and at once savage analysis of its vulgar and reprobate leadership.

Yet, even those who turn up their noses will come face to face with the Malrauxesque vision of the twentieth century universal symbol of the intellectual as tortured man of action ride "Academic Repression ...

... You incited students and staff of our institution to violence through your barrage of insulting and tendentious newspaper articles and lectures. The administration questioned the critical students one by one and offered them a chance to graduate: If they sign a letter of apology to the authorities, which accuses Dr. Keating of inciting them with heretical ideals, such as freedom, democracy, they are allowed to stay. If they refuse, they have to go, because "we find such impudence, calumny and subversion most unacceptable"

The power and originality of his work evokes memories of one of the 'anarchic' glories of the new, fledging anti-establishment left in our country. For Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau seems to have surpassed all other foreign commentators on politics, economy and culture in the intense glow of his writing as in 'Eruption and political change'.

To expose the hollowness and puncture the bloated hypocrisy of neo-colonial buccaneers and their cohorts in power, names become symbolic points in the process of demystification as in the irreverent and unapologetic "Paul and the gangs".

Was it not Georg Lukacs (Studies in European Realism; 1967) who regards great art as one which is "socially progressive" and the great artist as one, who is able "to recapture and recreate a harmonious totality of human life"?
Thus, we find in these pages that Dr. Schmidt-Soltau's greatest achievements are in the second and third phases of his book in which Juvenilian and Horatian satire cue and woo stylistic, congruence, irony, humour and sometimes pathos and despair mingle extricably.

Consider the myth of a 'jar of whisky' and the remarkable German conquistador Joseph Kerner (d. 1911) with his two gravestones:

"One day, when he was completely drunk he shot the senior officers Biernatczyk and Gniess and wounded the officers Nagel and Schnaebele, before shooting himself."

Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau at his best is both good and deep. His "Je ne regrette rien", for example, excels in tender lyricism, satire and irony. Therein, we find exquisite simplicity of the language, the gems of a nation's tortured homecoming and the lightness of cadence in technique.

He however reached the acme of revolutionary respectability by acquiring a certain Grecian hubris as in "A cage of Fools" and the techne or even by the Longinian hypsos as in "Ethnicity and Democracy".

His column in The Post was therefore remarkable for using the essayistic pantheon as contemporary historical praxis in which bourgeois, intellectual monasticism of systemisers, the hermeticism of casuists and sometimes outright windbags is impaled in favour of the rarefied sunshine of a scientific, rigorous and dialectical apprehension of Cameroonian reality.

This revolutionary scholar's work or contemporary anomalies are a significant contribution to socio-political and economic history of the Central African sub-region.

He stubbornly clings to the axiom of the Osagyefo Kwame Nkrumah is intellectual avatar that the course of ideas must be auxiliary indeed at once play second fiddle to the course of things ...

His teaching and writing is therefore relentlessly probing and proactive. Unashamedly challenging, stultifying conventions.

It questions the past, laments the present and seems to maintain an unshaken faith in the future.

His research proffers a somewhat acid picture of a de-realised and dysfunctional sub-region in its apogee of fugue-mania; in nemesis.

Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltu has turned out to be a refreshing catalyst of change. A complete surprise from other "outsiders" such as the twentieth century Nebu-Chadnezzar ilk of the Tsar Chirac in that his populist, proletarian liberation gnoseology will, hopefully, make Cameroonians begin to think.

The political rigmarole is over ...

Bate Besong, Ph.D.
Winner of ANA Literature (Drama) Prize
Dept. of English University of Buea - Cameroon

8th July 1999.

"Conjuring the eruptive might of a volcanic giant, Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltu embarks upon a ruthless mindwalk to set new standards among social critics. In an unremittingly challenging appeal to society the author instigates a hitherto unseen firework display of freedom of expression from a baseline of fresh marxian magma. Daring and provocative. Not for the soft-spoke"

Guy Thomas
Prospects for a future beyond the ruling Neo-Liberalism and its socio-economic constraints went out of fashion some years ago. The revolutionary movement in which all alternative concepts of society started and developed, lost its force. Former militants are acting in today's world within the existing structures of politics or within the fenced monasteries of 'Saint Marx' and 'Saint Anarchy' - two versions of escapism which don't carry any input for social change. While prospects for a different future are no longer en vogue, it is obvious that a global society exclusively based on economic priorities is unable to handle the transformational creative power of technical revolution to the extent that the end of direct manual labour offers achievable objectives for the broad mass of global population. The increasing productivity is only able to develop her liberationary impacts to the full when the reduction of working time produced by society no longer ostracises its unproductive human parts, but becomes tangible as a chance for individual and societal satisfaction of needs apart from commodity fetishism. A first step in that direction is to recall the universal ideals of 'Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité' in their comprehensive and original meaning as an integral concept of a full life, which remains still shadowed as enlightening aims in a world darkened by economic madness. A distorted and broken version of 'Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité' can be found not only in the alienated ideologies of capitalism and in the remote theories of Marxism and Anarchism, but also in the so-called African philosophy. The extensive review in my paper the necessity to
focus on the causal subject of human history clarifies at the beginning of a new millennium: mankind in its frightening unity as a societal individual and as an individual which creates society.

An environment which contributes to the substantial and original interpretations of development was and is society in developing countries. According to the fact that Marx’ theses are strongly linked to the European mode of production, thinkers like Roy, Fanon, Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor launched a programme of critical Marxism which was linked to African realities as well as to the objectives of general human emancipation. Nonetheless, it is obvious that all these theses were closely linked to a world split up into the blocks of socialism and capitalism respectively. In 1991 this situation came to an end, but critical Marxism all around the world does not focus on these facts and even strong Marxist movements like the one in Southern Africa seem to be unable to answer the relevant questions. My paper tries to open a discussion on societal development in Africa with an analysis, on the one hand of the comprehensive practical test that the Marxist approach to societal development had undergone in nearly one third of the world for more than seventy years. On the other hand, ‘African philosophy’ is referred to in order to answer the questions which arise from the breakdown of this attempt and the existing distance between all theories of societal development and African reality. As a first step towards the envisaged combination of general human emancipation and individual satisfaction of needs, my paper focuses on the following questions:

- **The institutional framework of societal development.** Under this headline current changes within the complexes of state and economy are discussed with special regard to the gradual disintegration of governmental structures, especially in Africa. The prospected comprehensive interpretations of ‘Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité’ are taken into consideration as general objectives. Which types of state and which forms of association are able to link up or even to be amalgamated with a self-determined exteriorisation of man?

- **The organisation of revolutionary movements according to the structures of interaction in present and future societies.** While authority in general used to be theoretically rejected, it is obvious that all over the world authority seems to exist in accordance with all social classes. The enlightenment condemns this mental immaturity but gives rise to the subordinating forces of common sense. Africa offers a large variety of authoritarian patterns to survey. My paper focuses on a new understanding of authority within the process of development which encompasses African reality as well as ‘abstract’ aims of fundamental liberation.

- **The strategy to translate the prospected societal development into action.** To discuss the practicability of the prospects outlined above exceeds the bounds of this paper. If possible, an open debate can take place around the ‘why’ and the ‘how’. While the lecture offers reasons for change and arguments for a strategy based on individual needs as well as the concept of general human emancipation, concrete forms of intervention by individuals or groups could never be declared ex cathedra. Ethics and
moral codes of all political schools of thought failed in everything they ever tried to realise. The prospected concept of societal development attempts to bear that in mind. “Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But, for man, the root is man himself.” (Marx 1,385)

Prospects for Peace in the developing world

What needs are being generated by the developing world? What chances are there for peace in the face of the gradual disintegration of governmental structures?

Constructive and destructive needs outside the limiting forces of law and convention became visible in areas of Africa that are lacking stable governmental structures. Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Northern-Chad and the two Congos thereby developed a new model of universal freedom for the individual that could be used as an example for the unhindered realisation of individual needs. Many researchers are of the view that the different processes through which African governments try to assure peace and security to their citizens could serve as a model for many other countries in the world. Whereas most researchers have focused only on the means to control the tendency that need-fulfilment results to destructive behaviour, I have undertaken a study on the underlying causes of these behaviours in the framework of societal structures and historical processes. In my view, it is on this basis that a model for a peaceful and secure society should be developed, using Marxist methodologies which could potentially provide a clearer view of the problems, although in the current debates on this subject, such methodologies have hardly been used. In the first part of this essay, the theoretical background of destructive human needs will be discussed, and in the second part, results and prospects of a field research concerning a selection of African societies will be presented.
Increasingly, in today’s world, moral norms - whether based on tradition, convention, or belief - appear unable to provide the means by which human beings can live together without conflict. This is due to the fact that human beings’ competing interests and needs arising from pressures generated by economic and social problems can no longer be satisfied within the limits of the existing moral order. The question then arises as to whether it might be the case that only authoritarian governmental structures have the capacity to control the destruction that often results from attempts to satisfy human needs to a great enough extent that a physically safe and materially secure existence will be guaranteed to a majority of human beings. But the answer to this question is clear: such a security would be a false one, insofar as it would be based not on the elimination of violence as a solution to individual and inter-group conflicts, but rather on the negation of the need for peace and security of human beings that arises from destructive needs.

But this leads to two further questions: Why do such needs arise in the first place? Could the conditions these needs arise from be modified in such a way that the attempts to satisfy them might lead to constructive endeavours rather than violence?

Based on the reassessment of Marxism I recently carried out in my 1997 book, it would appear that, due to its linkage of economic, social, and political elements, this view of the world is in a position to analyse needs beyond moralistic wishful thinking and conditions imposed by power in order to find out whether these destructive tendencies are quasi-objective anthropological constants, or whether modern political and historical processes have given birth to them. In the past, Marxism, with its positivist view of man, failed to sufficiently take into account human drives and motivations. This was because Marxism reduced Marx’s many-faceted theory to one narrow aspect: the drive to obtain property and economic wealth. This one-dimensional view contributed considerably to the downfall of Marxism.

If one accepts the thesis that the hierarchy of human needs gives rise to war and geopolitical conflicts, the question then arises how and why these needs come into being. The resulting critical examination of alternative approaches to deal with the various need structures is designed to move away from a type of need evaluation about which Foucault wrote, “the dialectic of the irrational remains silent in this garrulous relationship, and forgetfulness arises from the silent inner strife of men.”

According to Marx, despite the existence of dynamic processes within groups or societies as a whole, only individuals can be thought of as subjects with needs to be satisfied. Marx states that neither “society as subject” nor “the person” exist as subjects, even though he states elsewhere that “the needs of the people viewed as individual’s needs constitute the least important reason to satisfy them.” Thus, if the differentiating processes of society were taken into account, then societal interests such as insuring the continued existence of the human species would not be ignored. Nonetheless, this would lead to less emphasis being placed on the achievement of a peaceful society than on the satisfaction of individual needs. According to Antiphon, the hidden contradiction contained in demands for
material equality couched in collective terms guarantees that they will inevitably result in relations of inequality. This is of central importance insofar as achieving a world of peace and security is concerned, due to the fact that the external appearance of a collective security cannot support individual satisfaction; achievement of this facsimile of security will tend to undermine the bases on which societal harmony rests. A further, unanswered question arises from this: what value should be given to equality when viewed in terms of the satisfaction of needs?

Both the characteristically Marxist reductive definition of the individual in terms of economic categories as well as the application of the underlying concept of "the inherent human being" that characterised Marxism west of the Iron Curtain, should be eschewed for the same reasons as hierarchical models that separate general from individual needs. When research on needs attempts to place needs in opposing categories such as basic organic vs. developmental human, creative vs. productive, physical vs. social, or biogenetic vs. sociogenetic, Adorno's warning should be recalled, according to which "the societal and natural need event are inseparable entities." This is because while there seems to be a clear distinction between the needs for material security experienced by the individual and his cultural and spiritual needs, the question nonetheless remains how and where to measure the distance - not to mention draw the line - between the two. Engels rallied against such a separation when he described human nature as "half beast, half angel". In addition, Irene Döllinger has posed the pointed question as to whether man should not think of his cultural needs simply "as spirit over the waters". Perhaps a precise examination of the origins of needs and the philosophical explorations surrounding them could provide some insight into their inner workings. For despite all of the criticism that has been levelled at models of primary and secondary needs, it would nonetheless appear true that the societal make-up of individuals is variable instead of pluralistic. This is due to the fact that such models are unconscious and can only be understood in concrete terms.

Marx understood the development of needs in the individual to be a process whereby suffering is transformed into "concrete expression of need," because for the individual "each aspect of his being and characteristics, each of his strivings (...) leads him to needs and wants, that in his search for himself leads him to desire, unconsciously, other things and people." Although in children the transformation of need into necessity is largely an unconscious process, adults soon discover that "life consists primarily of eating, drinking, having a place to live and clothing to wear, and a few other things." In today's society, the individual, through production and consumption, is confronted with a great number of needs, through which the need to consume the goods produced by society is awakened. Or as Marx put it, "the art object - like any other product - creates an audience that is both sensitive to art and inclined to aesthetic enjoyment. The process of production produces not only an object for a subject, but also a subject for an object." The latter can either be criticised, as it is by Peter Hacks when he remarks that the capacity for leisure-time acquisition of material or spiritual truth is common to all human beings, but that in post-capitalist society, what is available for acquisition is produced in an incorrect way, such that human beings now live with noise and advertising", or, as he calls it, with "the
mystery of productive consumption” which is a fundamental concept in the Marxist theory of consciousness. In a letter to Nikolai Danielson, Marx himself expressed the view that the process of a productive consumption was becoming part of man's thought processes: "...one needs only to observe the way things are developing at the moment; and it is only when they have fully ripened that one can 'productively consume,' that is, theoretically speaking." But how close is the relationship between production and consumption? And are Marxists correct when they assert that production is influenced by consumption to so great an extent that for all practical analytical purposes only two groups, producers and consumers, exist?

In addition to the effects on the individual's hierarchy of needs arising from production, Marx also viewed demographic, societal and cultural processes as determinants of the evolution of needs. While Marxism considered the so-called "objective aspect of material production" to be the key determinant of a "consistently materialistic outlook," compared to which all other elements play only a subjective role. Seev Gaziet, by contrast, defines needs simply as "objective necessities for human dignity." This is a strikingly precise formulation, inasmuch as it does not posit an abstraction (the object) as satisfying his needs as subject within the framework of a society as a whole, but rather sees the living human being as attempting to pursue his own concrete dreams and aspirations, even if they seem totally meaningless to those around him. To Marx, the concept of work is particularly important in this regard: work is not seen as a concrete form of salaried labour, but rather as an instrument to release inner potentialities. He criticises Adam Smith for failing to realise that "when the individual is in his normal state of feeling adequately healthy, strong, active, intelligent and clothed, he also needs, as a matter of course, an adequate amount of work and quiet respite away from work." According to Marx, this essential need for work is related to an activity that is of central importance, one that "apart from the efforts of the organs, which are working, [involves] the goal-oriented will that radiates attentiveness while the work is being done." This is all the more true, Marx says, because "the less they [the organs] are swept along by the act of doing the work and the manner in which it is carried out, the less the worker will derive pleasure from the expenditure of his own mental and physical strength." Klaus Holzkamp, in a similar formulation, describes work as "the ability to deal with things in the world, the most basic conditions for the dignity of the human being." Peter Weiss views work as an expression of "the creative principle of the inner being of the human species." However, he states that this need should not be seen as separate from the impenetrable structure of needs, aspirations, and dreams. It cannot, he says, be understood as a kind of art for art's sake fulfilment of human needs, but rather as a socio-individual whole that at the very least gives rise to a minimum of meaningfulness.

Apart from the concrete nature of the need for work, the question remains if this need, the satisfaction of which is attained through the individual's striving for contentment, should be viewed as a practical and emancipating philosophical outlook providing a means to the establishment of a harmony among human beings; or, rather, if this need gives rise to (self-)destructive and aggressive behaviour which, when manifested, can lead to war or geopolitical conflicts.
Even in societies in which social bonds have been weakened, and slavery and power relationships are no longer legitimised through custom and tradition, the question still remains as to whether, besides alienating social conditions there might also exist needs within the individual to commit destructive acts. Even though Stirner is correct in stating that obsequiousness leads to authoritarian behaviour, the problem of meaningless violence remains, because destructive needs go beyond the limits of the individual. In any case, here there is no question of hypothetical men in hypothetical societies testifying in the witness stand, but rather the real possibility of them undergoing real (social and psychological) change. In this case, Marx is correct to say that "the structure of alienation is such that the refinement of needs and the means to their satisfaction gives rise to exploitation. But on the other hand, this savage behaviour produces very simple, raw, and abstract needs" and that "productive labour and the means of communication once they are controlled and owned by private interests, become destructive forces." And the question, mentioned above, still remains, whether this tendency to become destructive is in reality always and exclusively the result of alienation; or is it perhaps more likely that there exists in men a basic (self-) destructive drive that seeks for satisfaction?

According to this theoretical outline it seems as if human society as a whole could live in peace if the origins of destructive tendencies were successfully identified, since the underlying causes of war and power conflicts might be eliminated. The societal processes in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Northern Chad and the two Congos serve as examples for areas, in which governmental processes and morality no longer prevent individuals from satisfying their own destructive needs. In these societies, the false peace of modern life does not exist, but is replaced by structural anarchy. Many researchers are of the view that this structural anarchy will become increasingly widespread in the future. The different societal systems with their different historical structuring processes have been studied in two directions: on the one hand, the ways in which the various societies deal with the phenomenon of destructive needs; and on the other, the repercussions of unrestricted manifestations and realisations of these destructive tendencies in their interactive forms, in which the individual is the only person held accountable for his actions. If either classical political philosophy or the images that mass media bring into our homes are to be believed, life consists of conflicts between human beings. However, this fact does not augur well for peace and security in the world. Moreover, the prospects appear to be even worse, if one views the rapid rate of change in today's world as bringing about the complete destruction of political systems and structures.

In this regard, ongoing field research in Africa yields data on the effects of unchecked manifestations of both productive and destructive satisfaction of needs by individuals, and especially about their effects in the context of the community. Different models of anarchistic communities that provide no institutionalised guarantees of peace and security to their members have been studied in order to find out to what extent they provide a basis for the development of an harmonious existence based on satisfaction of needs. Apart from the Tubus in Northern Chad who have hardly had any contact with civilisation, and the societies of Sierra Leone and Rwanda which for many years were seen as models of developing
countries in Europe and North America, my research focused on societies which, having first experienced a "developing" phase, subsequently "lapsed" into anarchy, and today are attempting (i.e. are being forced by third parties) to resolve their problems by means of a subject to subject discourse (Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa).

Thus, a concrete point of departure is the re-establishment of communication modalities between, on the one hand, subjects with hegemony-oriented needs representing the majority of the population and on the other, subjects with destructive tendencies in their personality structures. This leads in all likelihood to two further questions: How do anarchic communities deal with phenomena which in modern societies are subsumed under the category of madness? What explanatory models do they use for deviant behaviour, and how can these explanations be classified?

In Tubu society destructive needs hardly become visible because the hyper egoistic way of living, which seems to be the result of existence on the dark side of moon, prevents the individuals from each form of sympathy. If someone even kills someone else just for fun, a Tubu will neither ask for reasons nor for punishment but pay tribute to the murder's boldness. In interactions without any form of societal consciousness the category of destructive needs only generates meaning for strangers who have the useless notion to search behind actions for a comprehensible meaning, which is in the view of the Tubu a lunacy.

Inside Rwanda and Sierra Leone, people with destructive needs can easily hide themselves within the crude ethnic conflicts, because nothing is easier than to find an abstract reason for the satisfaction of personal needs. While capitalism offers that kind of individuals only the possibility of unlimited economic oppression, the ethnic ideology offers them means of justifying rape, murder, torture, bombing, ruining, vandalism and all other actions which satisfy their destructive needs. These destructive needs become visible only for victims, the ethnic-group of the victims - but for both within an ethnic interpretation system -, and for researchers, who find them concealed in the ethnic-rhetoric. In the case of Rwanda researchers try to work out the gap between ethnic-based violence and destructive needs by focusing on how genocide was enforced. Adelman and Suhrke point out that even an ethnic-based genocide with the ideal to slaughter all members of an ethnic group does not explain why most corpses were brutal dismembered after the killing. My ongoing research focuses on the question whether a short explosion of violence like the three weeks genocide in Rwanda satisfied people with destructive needs sustainably, because in that case an occasional venting could be organised. As a first result I claim that even if this would be possible, the time and the intensity required for the satisfaction of destructive needs vary from individual to individual, this demanding a complex mechanism of control to allow each individual his form of destruction.

The two Congos can be understood as well within the theoretical framework which I established viewing the genocide in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. In the case of Congo-Kinshasa, the idea of liberation features merely as a justifying argument for slaughtering members of the Mobuto clan, even though everybody was aware that his power would soon come to an end and was not used in its original meaning as a concept for
organising a better future. In Congo-Brazzaville the masses used the conflict between a pro-American and a pro-French government to launch a riot in which destructive needs detonate like a heavy rain after the long and hot days of oppression. Actually, these riots - which are also taking place in the US from time to time - can be understood as an incomplete and unorganised prospect on what I would call a modern and participatory form of peace and security in a developing world, even though some people were involved without their consent in it.

In conclusion, my goal was to show that destructive needs also exist in anarchic societies, but that they succeed in reconciling destructive forces with other social phenomena by means of a concept which Foucault termed "the microphysics of power." If this hypothesis proves to be true in the ongoing field research, it will show that individual freedom and social harmony are not mutually exclusive and that peace and security are more than mere theoretical models.

"Tout ce que je sais, c'est que moi, je ne suis pas marxiste"  
Karl Marx

Marxism is dead, long live Karl Marx

In contrast to the classical practical philosophies – be it the doctrine of Confucius, Buddha, Jesus or Mohammed – modern practical philosophies have not been put into practice – with one exception: the theories of Karl Marx.

While the bourgeois world is only partly referring to philosophers like Rousseau or Locke, Kant or Hegel, Marx’ theory like no other modern practical philosophy before had to undergo a comprehensive practical test in nearly one third of the world for more than seventy years: "The proof of the pudding is the eating". Starting from this thesis postulated by Engels in 1892, it would today mean to miss out on an opportunity to create a new understanding of practical philosophy, if the Marxist experiment of putting Marx’ theory into practice was to be considered finished only referring to the fact that many people did not like the pudding, and without scrutinising if the cooks, the ingredients or even only a part of them have to be blamed for this dissatisfaction with the practice. This study’s critical analysis of "Marxist cooking" will show, that it was not the ingredients alone that spoiled the dish but mainly the cooks. This reflexive process of an analysis of a practical philosophy put into practice may enable us to give a philosophical judgement of Marx, Marxism, and future possibilities of practical philosophy. When this study is trying to recapitulate the long-term practical test that the
Marxist approach to interpret Marx’ theory has undergone and when it is attempting to make it usable for a new interpretation of marxian thought at the beginning of the 21st century, it has to be taken into account that alternative approaches have developed next to the remaining rubble of mainstream Marxism out of a criticism of that dominant variant.

The end of the states that claimed to have put the doctrines of Karl Marx into practise has led what is usually called Marxism into a serious crisis, even though some theorists do not want to realise it. The knowledge of this crisis is not new. As long as people were conscious of the fact that mistakes, errors and failings were existing, these would be worked on and they would be analysed. And every real inquiry would only show the existence of new mistakes, errors, and failings that would supply the basis for another round of search for knowledge. A special phenomenon that occurred in the study of practical philosophy according to Marx is that the internal development decreased at the same rate the supposed practical-political influence of the theory increased. Marx himself claimed, that “theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses”. But rarely did somebody return to the repercussion on the theory and the theorists, whose opinion was now mirroring the position of the supposed mass, or was at least supposed to. Critics of this approach, that called itself Marxism, had – like Bruno Bauer before – warned that people were not interested in knowledge, but in belief and that consequently Marxism could, to become effective, only be a new form of religion or had to be transformed into one in contrast to its original intention. A lot of analysts have pointed out the similarities between the history of the proletarian movement and the history of Christianity, be it crime during the Inquisition and the Stalinist killings of communists, or the fights of enthusiastic sectarians, the establishment of martyrs and saints or the ritual use of words and gestures. Nothing new so far.

One of the most important analyses of crisis - in my opinion - was attempted by Jean-Paul Sartre and the impact these analyses had on political philosophy in France, but also in other countries, should not be underestimated. Though Althusser always denied a connection between his proclamation of crisis and the theses of the existentialists, they were and still are only different answers to Sartre’s call to regain the theory of man – whose chief proponent he regarded to be Marx – from the Marxists and to revitalise it. Doing that, another phenomenon of this type of theory appeared. In a sort of time travel the different factions and sections of the huge edifice of ideas called Marxism tried to find an epoch that at least seemed to be void of mistakes and crime which could be used as a starting point to be successful in the present and even more so in the future. An analysis of possible alternative candidates, which cannot be done in this study, would show that Stalin was only able to get rid of alternatives (Bucharin, Trotsky, Radek, Sinovjev) because of his excellent tactical abilities – not because of anything else – and that they all shared one elemental misreading of Marx’ theory. An attentive analysis of the theoretical writings of the Russian party leaders would show that except for Lenin and Rjazanov, whose work was nearly purely scientific in character, hardly anybody had read...
beyond the main works of Marx and Engels, let alone studied the economic-philosophical roots of the worldview. Strangely, hardly anybody, except from some Hegelians, noticed that such an approach was contradicting all the principles of the theory that they were trying to save. If one understands practical philosophy like Karl Marx as the combination of being and consciousness starting with the single individual, how can the present and even more so the future then be explained by historic social totalities if it is taken into account that Marx had developed historicity as one of his central differences to idealist philosophy? Approaching things with "back to ...." is a pure idealist approach, that shows in its voluntarist every-day practice of "political realism" Sartre’s definition of Marxism as a "voluntarist idealism". So people who call themselves Marxists are pursuing policies for a class that can scientifically hardly be proven. And they are using means that were made up for different historic totalities and they have an aim that reminds one with its myths and legends more of paradise than of possible ways for people to live together. It is of course as wrong to despise the old, just because it is old. This study will show that a lot of old thoughts are today more relevant than a lot of those that appear to be new. To see consciousness and being as a duality in a total world without turning into the simple, given dead ends of old thinking, to give answers where questions can hardly be phrased, only because a supposed mass might demand it, is tightrope walking without a net, a salto vitale or mortale. Because it is common to think about the concept of practical philosophy only in relation to the third edition of the second volume of Capital or something similar, the extent of the topic chosen for this study is unusual. These single studies and detailed studies make sense and are useful, but their impact on a process of developing consciousness decreases as specification increases and new branches of inquiry develop, if there are no attempts to combine these single parts to a whole that forms a worldview. In order to give the reader some help in the discussion of the individual approaches and to make it possible to bring them together later, it is useful to give some central criteria that seem to be suitable to check the value of different interpretations of Marx’ work for a new interpretation of the primary sources before turning to these sources themselves. Without formulating the résumé of this work at this point it can be said that a new conception of practical philosophy in the tradition of Karl Marx has to set out in a dialectical approach: 1) Marx’ work 2) definite reality 3) itself and 4) the possibilities of a fundamental emancipation of man to gain the possibility for itself to become emancipatory. Before going into the criteria themselves, the concept of dialectics has to be explained: "In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of the state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less
than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose
upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary." When
Marx has the idea in this concise version of dialectics as
"historically developed form as in fluid movement", he
consciously places himself into a tradition of Hegel’s
explanations, though the method of presentation developed by
Hegel cannot be regarded as representative for the marxian
concept of dialectics in toto. This superficial impression can
easily develop because Marx never came up with his own
attempt to define dialectics although he announced it several
times. While Hegel – starting from a criticism of Kant’s
setting “thing in itself” against “phenomenon” – takes dialectics
as an immanent process of total constitution of the system of
logical definitions and gives it, by understanding it as logic, a
“relative stability”, Marx criticises this method without
leaving behind a real alternative. This might be grounded in
the fact that it seems impossible to give dialectics a palpable
form by writing it down without being undialectical, because
the written form does not strike the recipient as a “historically
developed form as in fluid movement” but as a rigid thing.

Analytical Marxism gives a solution to this problem. When for
example Erik Wright – starting from John Elster’s analyses –
conjectures that there were “reason(s) for holding (the theory,)”
that there is no dialectical method at all. He understands
dialectics at best as “a way of organising and directing thinking
at a pre-theoretical level, which, in some cases, facilitates the
discovery of insights that can be well expressed in terms
consonant with the norms of scientific culture.” In my opinion
this attempt fails because it is restricted to the marxian "method
of presentation” of things, that Marx discriminates from the
"method of inquiry": “Of course the method of presentation
must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to
appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms
of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only after
this work is done, the actual movement can be adequately
described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-
matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as
if we had before us a mere a priori construction.”

Analytical Marxism can be agreed with inasmuch as there is no obvious
marxian "dialectical method of presentation”. But this doesn’t
say anything about the marxian "method of inquiry”, that
appears as an "operational dialectics”, even though there is no
uniform representation of it and because of its internal structure
there cannot be one; or, to adapt a metaphor of Benjamin’s,
dialectics can not be learned from books like science, but it has
to be understood as a form of art that is based on learning by
doing.

Starting from this premise, there have to be criteria to separate
the process of a dialectical "method of inquiry” of a theory
from a non-dialectical one as well as to examine the "method of
presentation” in respect to their dialectical or non-dialectical
origin. Criticising Fritz Lang’s understanding of dialectics, that
extends the Hegelian method by a seeming "Kampf ums
Dasein”, Marx develops the judgement that Lang, because he
was taking Hegel’s explanations about logic at face value,
doesn’t grasp “first of Hegel’s explanations and because of that
second even less of my critical way of applying them. (…) Lang
is so naive as to say that I move in empirical material ‘with
exceptional freedom’. He does not know that this ‘free movement in the material’ is nothing else but a paraphrase for the method to treat the material – namely the dialectical method.’ According to this, the difference between the Hegelian ossified logical dialectics and Marx’ “operational dialectics” would consist only in the fact that Hegel justifies the structures of the de facto by his method while Marx reaches a criticism of social being by applying it in a “critical manner”. Despite this restriction, three questions remain that can only be answered by using Marx’ academic chef d’oeuvre because in contrast to his propagandistic and schematic explanations of dialectics, it depicts operational dialectics in action. The three questions that follow from the above are the following:

a) Why does Marx need a specific dialectical “method of inquiry”, when his form of presentation seems to be a priori and the Hegelian logic only critically reaches beyond the de facto? b) Which is the advantage of the marxian approach over the Hegelian method? c) How can the dialectical method of inquiry be recognised and how does it relate to the method of presentation?

ad a): The linking of seemingly unlinkable states of being by using the ideational method of dialectical dialogue was already regarded as the objective of dialectics in antique times. Against this background Marx makes use of this method in order to decipher “the enchanted, upside down and topsy-turvy world, haunted by Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre as social characters or as mere things.” “Classical economy sometimes contradicts itself in this analysis;” it often directly attempts reduction, without the middle parts, and tries to prove the identity of the source of the different forms. But this necessarily follows from their analytical method, where criticism and understanding have to start from. It is not interested in genetically developing the different forms, but rather in reducing them to their unity by analysing them, because it starts out by taking them as a prerequisite.” The résumé of extensive inquiry, which cannot be done in this work, could be the discovery that Marx’ dialectics is not analytically reducing the phenomena found in the world to one “dialectical world formula”, like Marxism did, but it contains next to its operational factor a “genetic form of analysis” that, starting from the thesis that any form of being is subject to historicity, overcomes objectivity, historicity, and relativity in a revolutionary way. Marx destroys the seeming self-evidence of the de facto to search behind the “objective” structures of being itself for being unknown to that point of time and tries to decode it even though the presentation of the results of this method of inquiry leads to a problem: The method of presentation can be re-evaluated as an ideology to legitimise being that does not exist at the time the results are set out because ”the standpoint of new (materialism) is humane society or social humanity,” and it consequently has to be – because of its vagueness in respect to the future that stems from the structure of being itself – open to a variety of interpretations that really or pro forma intend to put ”humane society or social humanity” into practice.

ad b): This revolutionary attitude towards the de facto is the principal difference and advantage of marxian dialectics, the
difference of which to Hegelian dialectics was worked out by Marx in a criticism of Lasalle in 1858: Lasalle "will find out to his disadvantage that it is a totally different thing to specify the main tenets of a science through criticism, to present it dialectically, or to apply an abstract finished system of logic to an idea of such a system." The marxian dialectics is no speculative, "encyclopaedic" dialectics of thinking, of nature, and of the spirit like Hegel's, but the dialectics of history in its being a concrete factor of transformation of the de facto to a communism that in the "German Ideology" is to Marx and Engels "not a state that has to be produced, an ideal that reality has to aim for", but they "call communism the real movement that removes the status quo". When Marx himself becomes involved in the historic process on the side of those who he thinks, according to his analyses and theses, have the ability to revolutionise the de facto, his dialectics themselves becomes an element of contradiction and of resolution in the sense of a conscious negation. It consequently stands not only in contradiction to the faction of society that is set as antagonist, but also to the activists of his own movement. Through this multiple confrontation Marx opens up a practical philosophy that 'behaves' dialectically towards its own results, that has the possibility to become a central element of emancipation itself by a unique revolutionary act against the de facto. The concept of emancipation will be dealt with later.

**ad c):** As the key elements of marxian dialectical method of presentation the three levels structure of presentation, sequence of categories, and the transition from one to the other can be identified. But even here no difference to the Hegelian method of presentation can be found, which led Dühring to one of the major attacks on marxian dialectics and Engels to a reply and explanation that seems worth quoting: "It is a total lack of understanding of the nature of dialectics if Herr Dühring thinks of it as an instrument of pure proving, like one can narrowly understand formal logic or elemental mathematics. Even formal logic is above all a method for finding new results, for progressing from the known to the unknown, and, only in much more eminent sense, dialectics, which on top of that contains the seed of a comprehensive world view, because it breaks through the narrow horizon of formal logic, is just the same."

Beyond the ordering function dialectics has for the presentation of results of inquiry that have been produced in a different way, Engels gives dialectics, without making it explicit, a function that brings to mind Aristotelian and Platonian definitions of dialectics as "the art of finding". This conflicts even in its general form with the function of dialectics of establishing a world view. Because neither Marx nor Engels have, while Marx was living, focused on the system of interactions of these three functions but only underlined the immense importance of the heuristic function by their theoretical practice, it was easy for Marxism, which was developing after Marx' death in 1885, to replace, by stressing the other two functions of dialectics, the specific character of the marxian understanding of dialectics by a schematic content of dialectics that draws on Hegel. By doing this, dialectics was given the character of a general law of being that reminded more of a general cosmology than of the marxian project of a critical pervasion of the structures of the de facto. Engels could not and did not want to oppose this tendency and
even promoted efforts to construct an evolutionism out of Marx’ heuristic-critical dialectics by his work "Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der Klassischen Deutschen Philosophie". In dissociation from the marxist functionalising of dialectics as a general law of motion of being, the discovery of the heuristic function of dialectics in its philosophical and methodological explanations of the individual authors seems to present itself as a criterion for an interpretation of dialectics in the marxian tradition. Consequently it has to be checked if the individual authors succeed in extending the amount of knowledge and if they are able to give the reader comprehensible evidences. Authors who are just aiming at keeping up the appearance of a superficial unity of a “comprehensive world view” based on dialectics and who want to defend it against criticism, cannot be used as a part of a new practical philosophy in the tradition of Karl Marx. Neither can attempts to keep up ways of thinking that have been shown to be insufficient.

After having developed the understanding of dialectics this work is based on, we can now turn to examine the criteria for a revolutionary, emancipatory, and practical philosophy in the tradition of Marx, that has to be dialectically directed towards

1) Marx’ work
2) reality
3) itself
4) towards the possibilities of a fundamental emancipation of man

To gain the possibility to become emancipatory in itself.

ad 1): What is Marx’ work, in how far is it differs from Marxism, and how can practical philosophies 'behave' dialectically towards it?

For a philosophical concept the question of continuity or discontinuity of interpretations of Marx’ work arises. In this study Marxism up to 1991 is taken as one possible interpretation next to others. Additionally it has to be taken into consideration that in contrast to everyday understanding there is no antagonism between continuity and discontinuity, because continuity without discontinuity would mean an absolute standstill which can, according to all knowledge modern science has produced, not exist in a space-time-structure. The seeming leap from continuity to discontinuity has to be interpreted as a problem of human cognitive faculty. Without knowledge of the process for example, the continuous growth of a human progressing from the first cell division to the temporary result of the process – the adult human being – seems to be discontinuous. This is why this study turns against a simple "back to Marx", because if the fundamental dominance of historic processes is supposed, as is to be justified later, nobody can be put back into a state of innocence. Consequently a new reasoning for practical philosophy in the tradition of Karl Marx should not aim at establishing an impossible, absolute continuity, but rather try to reach a well grounded continual discontinuity. In this sense it seems to be a precondition for a practical philosophy in the tradition of Marx to break with some untimely theses of Marx.

But to what extent can the dialectical-discontinuous process of interpretation of Marx’ primary work done by the authors analysed in this study be used as a criterion for the inclusion of single trains of thought into a practical philosophy of the
future? Just like when dealing with dialectics itself, a dialectical reference to thoughts already existing – consequently to any form of interpretation or criticism – has to discriminate the method of inquiry, that remains in the dark of the past, because all authors dealt with in this study are dead, from the method of presentation. When comprehensibility has been regarded as an elemental criterion in the concise explanations of a dialectical method of presentation, this is also true for any form of interpretation. If an author is referring to the continuity of one of Marx’ theses, it has to be examined, what position the passage has in Marx’ works, if the author can ground his/her application on current problems and finally, if the reader has to perceive the approach as a deus ex machina or if he/she can follow the course of the presentation. Theses in which the individual authors want to give the reader the impression that positions are authentically Marx, meaning that Marx would have held them himself, had he not disappeared from the political and academic stage a hundred years ago, have to be examined in even greater detail. On a third level statements have to be discussed in which the authors consciously turn against positions held by Marx and thus push the discontinues process of interpretation beyond the sphere of interpretation and develop on the basis of their individual interpretation of Marx new elements of practical philosophy. In addition to the criterion of comprehensibility of justifications for instrumentalising passages of Marx’ texts for theses on the said three levels, the criterion of authenticity is inevitable here. Not only can it not be understood in its simple form here – checking that quotes have neither been taken out of their context nor willingly manipulated – but it also has to be examined if the authors have taken the specific element of dynamics of marxian dialectics into account and if they have related the place where the statement was found to the statement itself. In contrast to Hegel’s schematic dialectics based on logical laws, in which the laws of motion of all spheres of statement are equally structured, the immanent structures in Marx vary depending on the sphere of statement. The sphere of deterministic teleology of the historical process cited for example by Jon Elster can mainly be found in practical-political texts like letters, articles, prefaces and explanations concerning the political practice of the revolutionary movement. The practical-philosophical results of this method of presentation have to be dealt with very carefully, not least because they often contradict scientifically grounded positions and can only be interpreted without distortions if they are put in the context of the historical situation and of the letters that were directed against them. Not only is the sphere of scientifically grounded positions divided into method of inquiry and method of presentation – the two other spheres mentioned by Jon Elster – but also in hypotheses and analyses, where on the one hand hypotheses are based on analyses, but on the other hand all of Marx’ analyses, even the ‘Criticism of Political Economy’, have to be seen in a hypothetical connection of the world as it was at Marx’ times and the world how it should be according to Marx’ wishes. The best known thesis by Feuerbach, according to which “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it”, is one of Marx’ central hypotheses, and thus any immediate separation of analysis, respectively interpretation, and hypothesis, respectively the process of being put into practice, from theory is incompatible with marxian
dialectics. As a criterion for the inclusion of elements of the interpretations of Marx that are analysed in part two and three of this work into a possible new formation of practical philosophy in the tradition of Karl Marx it has to be checked if they relate to Marx’ work according to the sketched dialectical mode of interpretation or not. If the mode of interpretation differs, it is important to return to the context of reasoning, because the criteria chosen here are obviously subject to a dialectical-historical process and cannot be regarded as a final truth.

ad 2): What is concrete reality and how can one 'behave' dialectically towards it?

In my opinion, any theory, including the analyses and hypotheses of Marx and the other thinkers analysed in this study, have to be put into the context of their concrete reality in order not to only complacently repeat universal and timeless statements, but to open up a new round of dialogue in the search for truth about this reality by referring to the definitely obsolete. Though the truth about the world itself doesn’t appear at the end of the new round, a greater world of known truth will come into existence. In the Feuerbach theses Marx was simplifying things when he put an end to epistemological problems of truth and reality by referring to human practice: "The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth -- i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question." But in spite of this seeming simplicity of the mediation of subject and object, the exact meaning of truth in the marxian use can be developed out of this central thesis about the term. This gives access to the question of the veracity of different theoretical receptions of concrete reality. Marx thought that the connection of the question of objectivity of thinking and the problem of an objectification of man that is understood as practice could be solved by negating the theoretical character of the question of truth. He should have added though that this level of objectivity always remains a level of man’s knowledge about reality that does come closer and closer to the absolute level of reality by the extension of human knowledge; but because it expands through both a historical process and the moment of reflection, it can be doubted that it can ever be experienced in its totality. For the criterion of relating dialectically to concrete reality the problem arises that – if it is assumed that there is no objective knowledge, but that there is only subjective access to reality – no objective comparison of different theories in relation to their dialectical interaction with reality can be presupposed. Not least, it is against this background that Marx disputes the importance of the question of truth as a fact of reason in idealist philosophy and reduces it to the status of a method of examination of practical theories that manifests itself in practice. This however may lead to legitimising the instrumentalisation of the de facto as a test for truth, that can easily result in a pure ideology of legitimisation of the existing, which once broke Hegel’s neck. In contrast to Hegel, and also Feuerbach, Marx attempts to present a true understanding of reality as a double imperative of practical theory in its process
of objectification in and through practice by transforming the concept of truth from a sphere of cognition into a sphere of historical practice of subjects.

While Marx and Engels only marginally dealt with the problem of objectifiability of experienced reality, Lenin developed in his discussion of phenomenalism and agnosticism in his book "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" the very dogmatic idea that "the standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge", also when he said that "we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely." Even though Lenin, and in his succession Marxism, did not formally claim to hold "eternal truths" about concrete reality, the "materialist creed" still seems to ennoble the believer by his possessing endowing him/her with the best possible truth. Lenin argues in the tradition of Engels' "Feuerbach", which is, as mentioned above, only fit for limited duties in analysing Marx' views, against any form of idealism and empirism, which to Engels and Lenin seemed to be the main symptom of idealism and solipsism and which strengthened their belief to represent the objective side in the antagonistic pair of subjectivism-objectivism. Marx in his theses about Feuerbach uses a different approach and tries to make the antagonist pair, which he thought to have emerged from idealist philosophy, obsolete altogether by drawing on material objectivity, because Marx not only thought himself as an antagonist of idealist subjectivism, but he was also rejecting Feuerbach’s "vulgar" objectivism, that was according to Lenin’s and Engels’ criteria. In contrast to his epigones, Marx is of the opinion that "the chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism -- which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such." Marx claims under the label of a subjectivist point of view, the position of practical opposition to an abstract objectivism – even if it seem to be materialist, because the subjectivist side is the "active side". From this of course it doesn’t follow for Marx that an idealist subjectivism has to be combined schematically with a materialist objectivism, but that the practice has to be thought as objectivity sui generis, not in the sense of an expansion and re-evaluation of the concept of objectivity, but by conceiving in contrast to Feuerbach "human activity itself as objective activity". When one goes back to the starting point of this excursion, it will become clear that there is no absolute criterion of a dialectical relation to definite reality itself. But interpretations of Marx' work, that can be integrated into a new version of practical philosophy in a productive way, have to point out the individual and subjective access of the author to their view of definite reality in a comprehensible way, so the reader can judge on the background of his/her own world view, if he/she wants to subscribe to the point of view of the author or not.

ad 3): How far can the autoreflexive element of dialectics be used as a criterion for judging practical philosophy and how can it be applied?
A major problem of the method of presentation of dialectical processes is the fact that, being in written form, they do not appear to be "historically developed form as in fluid movement" to the reader any more, but a monolithic basis of the individual world view of the author. This impression is intensified as if in an overview the lifework of interpreters of Marx' is analysed and one has to notice that they have – starting from a basic "inspiration" – interpreted Marx' work, the world, and their own position in the historical process for decades without ever questioning these fundamental theses on the background of expanded knowledge in a self-critical way. This self-critical reflection on theoretical and practical positions can of course not be understood as an outward constraint as postulated by Stalin$^{90}$ and Shdanow$^{91}$ which resulted in a strange mixture of criticism and self-criticism where one was self-critical for the other, any self-conscious, self-critical statement was turned against its author finding its tragic reversal in self-accusation, great "confession", and capital punishment, but it has to be spontaneous practice as it was the case with Marx and Engels. Especially the organisational mixture of criticism and self-criticism, where not reality but the leadership of the party took over judging, prevented the spontaneous, progressive act of individual self-criticism, without which a dialectical development of own thought and, consequently, action is hardly possible. Dialectical reflection of oneself and one’s own work, respectively the self-critical questioning of one’s own premises, can only be taken as a criterion for the connection of single works of an author, because the moment of publication gives own thoughts "in fluid movement" a "developed form", that in a positive case only shows movement in the sum of all publications.

ad 4): What is to be understood by the concept of basic emancipation of man and how can a theoretical version of a practical philosophy become involved in this process?

Emancipation, to which in my opinion practical philosophy has to contribute something to deserve its name, falls into the two basic elements of partial emancipation (like for example the social emancipation of women, the political emancipation of Jews and the economic emancipation of workers) and the general human emancipation. While Marx still saw general and political emancipation as identical in his "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 'Staatsrecht'"$^{93}$ if it is at the end of a double criticism (one of Hegel's political philosophy and one of constitutional monarchy), he managed – starting from the criticism of the explanations of Hugo Bauer concerning the Jewish question, in which Bauer just like the early Marx uncritically mixes these two elements of emancipation – to conceptualise$^{94}$ this duality and to characterise their specific connection under the maxim of human emancipation: "All emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself. Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical person. Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular
situation, only when man has recognised and organised his 'own powers' as social powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished. It is evident that Marx in this phase considers the general human emancipation synonymous with revolution, communism, and the elimination of alienation as the immediate next step in human development. In the introduction to "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law" for the first time the great thought of a combination of partial emancipation and general human emancipation forms what was to dominate Marx' later theoretical and practical work as a premise, that still has to be critically questioned today in spite of its central position. "Only in the name of the general rights of society can a particular class lay claim to general domination. For the storming of this emancipatory position, and hence for the political exploitation of all spheres of society in the interests of its own sphere, revolutionary energy and intellectual self-confidence alone are not sufficient. For the revolution of a nation and the emancipation of a particular class of civil society to coincide, for one estate to be acknowledged as the estate of the whole society, all the defects of society must conversely be concentrated in another class, a particular estate must be the general stumbling-block, the incorporation of the general limitation, a particular social sphere must be looked upon as the notorious crime of the whole of society, so that liberation from that sphere appears as general self-liberation. For one estate to be par excellence the estate of liberation, another estate must conversely be the obvious estate of oppression." No matter which concrete element the respective interpreters of Marx' work put into this general formula (workers versus capitalists, third world versus imperialist centre, or men versus women), all these concrete forms are united by the reference to the basic marxian political hypothesis of the connection of partial emancipation and general human emancipation. All his life, Marx claimed, starting from repeated new analyses of social reality, a status of temporary truth for this "historically developed form as in fluid movement". Its conscious cognition enables practical philosophy to put itself into effect, to abolish oppression, and to complete general human emancipation in alliance with the revolutionary subject by the practical re-interpretation of the world. Against the background of a continuous dominance of this premise, that, starting from empirical phenomena of his time, seems plausible, Marx in his political writings turns more and more to achieving the partial emancipation of workers, and he thus distances himself more and more from the concept of emancipation in order to conceptually separate this concrete economic emancipation of the working class from other partial emancipations which to Marx did not seem to be helpful for general human emancipation. In his later work this connection of aim and process of movement is nearly generally described by the concepts of communism and revolution that are understood by Marx as synonymous with general human emancipation; giving concrete content to them seems to him to be an emancipatory act as long as it does not remain in the sphere of pure concepts.

When a dialectical reference to the possibilities of general emancipation is used as a criterion to evaluate interpretations of
Marx’ work in this study, this has to be done with special attention to the relationship the individual authors have to this temporary marxian hypothesis. Approaches that a priori adopt this "historically developed form as in fluid movement" uncritically and without referring to their own analyse of reality have in my opinion to be checked, especially in respect to the comprehensible conclusiveness of their basic assumptions, before integrating them into a new version of the connection of general human emancipation at the beginning of the 21st century – which today has hardly different aims compared to Marx’ times – and analytically penetrating reality in the tradition of Marx. They face the elemental problem that their basic assumptions have become dubious. Because of the “nibbling” force of the historic process, the edifice of ideas can no longer be built upon these assumptions; the function they have in the process of emancipation has therefore changed: they cannot be used as a starting point any longer; at best, some elements can be used for a new construction of practical philosophy. Alternative attempts that can give a well founded connection of general human emancipation and partial emancipation of their own have to bear the question to what extent they succeed in making their project attractive for the reader in a well founded way. Interpretations of Marx that focus on formulating general human emancipation without going back to possibilities of putting it into practice have to be examined in order to find out what sense it makes to conceptualise an objective in precise terms if it appears to the reader as a utopia far beyond his/her reach.

In this study out of these contrasting positions the criterion I develop that only philosophy that theoretically prepares to forge a link between the world of the de facto and the goal by drawing hypotheses from analyses can itself become an element of emancipation and consequently a practical philosophy. It has to be mentioned, though, that the construction of a practical philosophy can be no single act, but only through the permanence of construction and deconstruction of a “historically developed form as in fluid movement” can philosophy be itself be integrated into the dialectical process of change as an element of emancipation, even though this study will appear to the reader as a rigid thing because of its method of presentation.

Before starting with the critical reflection of reality and its supposed mirrored picture given by Marxism, I will make some remarks about the basic structure of this study, that in the course of its development unconsciously came closer and closer to classical dialectical form. In principle it ties up with the first postulate of the necessity of newly acquired reality by Karl Marx expressed in a letter to Arnold Ruge in 1843, although it is to be shown later that Marx’ position at that time was not even suitable for coming close to achieving the high objective he aimed for. One can only hope that this study makes clear what the objective and the causal explanation for a new beginning in practical philosophy could be. "In fact the internal obstacles seem almost greater than the external difficulties. For even though the question 'where from?' presents no problems, the question 'where to?' is a rich source of confusion. Not only has universal anarchy broken out among the reformers but also
every individual must admit to himself that he has no precise idea about what ought to happen. However, this very defect turns to the advantage of the new movement, for it means that we do not anticipate the world with our dogmas but instead attempt to discover the new world through the critique of the old. Hitherto philosophers have left the keys to all riddles lying in their desks, and the stupid, uninhibited world had only to wait around for the roasted pigeons of absolute science to fly into its open mouth. Philosophy has now become secularised and the most striking proof of this can be seen in the way that philosophical consciousness has joined battle not only outwardly, but inwardly too. If we have no business with the construction of the future or with organising it for all time there can still be no doubt about the task confronting us at present: the ruthless criticism of the existing order, ruthless in that it will shrink neither from its own discoveries nor from conflict with the power that be.  

Theses
1) Marxism, which is a variant of interpretation of Marx’ work, in spite of his plurality failed in the course of history to do its duty of being an instrument for analysing capitalist society, and thus increasingly lost its emancipatory character. The term Marxism is used for the totality of interpretations of Marx that first regard themselves as Marxists and second referred to the then existing self-appointed socialist countries in some sympathetic way.

2) The main cause for this failure is the transformation of “scientific socialism” into a new form of theology performed by the representatives of the world communist movement. Because in this voluntarist idealism the inner development of the theory and, accordingly, the practice, developed from an analysis of the real world into a scholastic parroting of theoretical sources under the primacy of keeping the socialist states going. Marxism lost contact to the real world in the course of time until it finally diametrically opposed it. Marxism is to be criticised immanently and by confrontation with real events and processes in capitalist societies. It is thus to be consciously negated to make it possible to relate in a new way to the still existing emancipatory elements of Marx’ theory.

3) Because Marxism was in continuity to marxian theory, it was nearly inevitable that this lead to a productive development of single aspect of marxian theory, that are of importance for a new start in practical philosophy in the tradition of Karl Marx today. These elements, that can be found in the course of time increasingly outside official state Marxism, have to be examined in respect to their validity after the end of a bipolar world and they have to be integrated into a new formulation accordingly.

4) An understanding of the consequences of single aspects of marxian theory drawn from a criticism of interpretations of Marx’ put into practice, makes it possible to develop criteria in the run-up to a new interpretation that starting from the mistakes made try to prevent these or similar consequences of mistakes, errors and omissions of marxian theory from being repeated in a practice that is founded on an interpretation of Marx based on these criteria.
5) By evaluating reflections of marxian theses in practice a new interpretation of marxian theory will – at least in the opinion of the author – gain theoretical vehemence, which will underline its relevance in a pluralist argument about practical philosophies, if this reflexive process does not remain on its own. This new version of practical philosophy in the tradition of Karl Marx will show – knowing about its defeats and mistakes – if it can aim at and reach a real alternative to the existing order of lacking freedom, inequality, and contempt for mankind.

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**Inspections from Outside**  
**The Column in The Post**

A frequently heard complaint about my column is related to the idea that a European should not criticise African realities. A certain head of state, who lives most of the time in Europe, stated once that “African problems can only be solved by Africans” and his militants parrot this hackneyed phrase again and again. Even though it is obvious that some Africans do not want to hear any critique - neither from Europeans nor from Africans -, the question arises if Europeans are able to understand societies in Africa to an extent, which puts them in a position to criticise them.

In the ongoing debate on my expulsion in the internet, one person called me a neo-colonialist, because of my attempt to promote the ‘foreign’ idea of democracy. Even some Europeans hold the view that outsiders have to accept African societies as such, because they are visitors. On the one hand, this position pays tribute to the fact that Europe underdeveloped Africa through the invention of belief systems in the traditional African society - as Walter Rodney puts it. On the other hand, one must be totally self-satisfied and indifferent towards the society and its individuals in order not to become involved in the struggle for freedom and democratisation, which is fought by Africans in Africa. Strangers, who claim to be neutral, are in fact supporting the power that be. A power which has to be seen as a result of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Some policy-makers hold the view that all attempts of criticising have to be punished as a form of denigration because
problems do not exist in the African society or are able to be solved perfectly from inside. The wish to cut oneself off from the open and global society and its ideals of democracy, free speech and productive critique is a common transfiguration of megalomaniac dictatorial leaders. Total separation is possible and even an aim of the Dependencia-Theory, but which African dictator wants to cancel his bank accounts in Switzerland, his economic income from international aid, his health-service in Germany or the shopping trips of the first lady?

A common metaphor for society is the human body, so problems within the society can be understood as sickness of the body. Even in the traditional surrounding of the African village, you do not rely solemnly on your inner feeling to solve a sickness but you consult a doctor who inspects your sickness from outside. If you have the impression that you have no sickness you would not read the doctor’s report. You would neither punish him nor ban its analysis. If you knew that you have a sickness which can be solved through treatment, you would listen to the doctor and even get a second opinion from another specialist. You only ban medical inspections from outside and punish your doctor, if you know that no treatment or analysis can help you anymore. If death, the grim reaper, knocks at the door some people even try to bribe father death with human sacrifices and traditional flagellation, but as the Nigerian posters say: Death noba take bribe! Your shroud has no pockets! The kingdom of the dead awaits its zombies, even if they do not open the Post anymore.

**Corruption and Development**

Immediately after Cameroon was rated the world’s most corrupt state, there were rumours going around, that Cameroon’s head of state failed to bribe in time, or was outdone by other corruption experts.

While social scientists analyse corruption and bribery as a phenomenon on the fringes of global society, in Cameroon it is omnipresent. Therefore the scientific argument, that corruption favours an individual to taxpayers’ disadvantage, does not describe the reality in Cameroon properly, because tax is neither an immovable duty nor a state income which benefits Cameroonian citizens in general. "Good governance”, the latest fashion created by the World Bank and the IMF is a foolish delusion and this not only for a country where everybody bribes everybody. It takes two to tango. At a quick glance corruption and bribery contradict development, but a thorough examination reveals that they are a normal way of interaction between citizens and their state-officials. This interaction can be divided into two groups:

1) If the citizen wants something from his rulers he has to pay for it. Some administrations call their bribe processing fees and offer receipts, some do not. So what? As opposed to a citizen in "well organised” states, the citizen of a corruptible state is able to control the processing. The citizen is a customer. If in his eyes the service is too expensive, he has to wait till prices fall.

2) If state-administration wants your money, you have to pay immediately all over the world. In some countries they
produce laws to obtain it, in some they wait just outside towns to collect it. At a venal police checkpoint the citizens can at least discuss the price.

Corruption in its monetary form came up in the early nineties, when the World Bank and IMF couturiers declared lean states as up-to-date fashion. This step towards modernisation grants most civil servants a trenchant cut of their salaries. Only politicians and soldiers were able to improve their first income within the last ten years, but Africans demonstrated that they understood the meaning of flexibility and privatisation. The introduction of a second salary in Cameroon based on direct contributions of the citizens and private donations awarded for excellent and fast services changed the administration completely. A straightforward processing in a friendly atmosphere awaits solvent customers because impoverished dropouts no longer hang around the office buildings. In a modern society corruption and bribery are an absolute need. It makes sense, because civil servants do not have to wait for token-payment from the government. It is planned, because all administrators from toilet-men to ministers benefit from this system. It is good for the citizens, because they only have to pay for booked performances and checkpoint clowns. It is good for the state, because politicians can concentrate on benefiting from international corruption and to cash up development agencies.

While Protestant ethics and Catholic self-denial hinder Europe and North America on the run for all-embracing corruption, the African patronage system fulfils perfectly all necessities of bribery. An outstanding example for “good governance” was produced by officials in the Republic of Congo: First the tiny elite got the French Oil-Concern Elf to pay state interest ten years in advance, then they started a fancy civil war and finally sold the oil again to US companies. Such a sustainable piece of marketing is only possible in a country like Cameroon. All-embracing corruption lays the foundations for development, because according to development theories, the modernising elite needs not only financial sources but also a liberal state. Liberalism as an ideology does not fit into African societies but all-embracing corruption produces the same effect even in dictatorial states like Cameroon. If you think such patterns of behaviour are vice, compare it with the development of capitalism in Europe and in the US. If you do not like capitalism, fine. If you want to achieve “positive” aims like environmental protection, social security and qualitative education bribe for them, or fight for them. You get nothing for free - nowhere on this planet.
Nature as Imagination

The lack of a nature-concept in Pidgin gave rise to multilayered problems which hinder the work of resource-management projects in anglophone Cameroon. Even if it is true that Pidgin is not the original language of anglophone Cameroon, but a language which was introduced to the inhabitants by African traders who returned from slavery in the West-Indies, it is closely linked to the mental content of the people in the south-west and north-west provinces. While English and French still comprise the conscious attitude of colonialism, Pidgin turned out as a perfect combination of the regional languages and the consciousness which is standing behind them. The major figure in modern hermeneutics, Martin Heidegger, pointed out that language is the house of being, which means that if there is no name for nature in Pidgin the problem of nature protection and environmental conservation does not exist for anglophone Cameroonians.

As it is impossible for those knights errant preaching sustainability to teach nature-protection in an environment where nature is unnamed and by this effect unknown, they forced their villeins to adapt nature in a way that it fits into the lived world created by Pidgin. Organisations with a religious background introduced "tin dem weh god mek'am" as a transcription for nature. If you translate it, you find that this "thing made by god" only achieves meaning, if you believe in a creating God and share the strange idea that an almighty God needs you to conserve his creation. Secular organisations introduced "tin dem fo we kona" and "tin dem around we", which paraphrase in a way environment but not nature, because without the distinction of good nature and bad civilisation nature protection stays meaningless. If forest and forestry are understood as equal parts of an unspecified environment, why should somebody protect the wood and not the woodsmen?

The invasion of names into the chaos of namelessness only makes sense if there is a societal consciousness that something lacks a name, otherwise the name "nature" just describes a white men's daemon. At first sight the naming of nature establishes a debate about the white men's dread, that their own experiences with nature repeat again and again. They became aware of it after they lost it, like men who start to appreciate health more and more while they deteriorate. But at the second view, it is a fact that a healthy man who recalls his own fate of decline every day, does not change anything about this fate, but the awareness of death undermines his health. Knowledge is power - but even if Cameroonians truly understand the meaning of the European concept of nature, it still remains uncertain that they fall in love with trees and abhor bush-meat. In Europe it was not the awareness about nature that gave rise to conservation movements, but the dread of modernity. Nature lovers do not love nature as such, but the memory of the carefree life of natural people. That this is a myth is known by everybody who stayed only one night in primary forest or any other so-called untouched nature - an illusion in itself -, but Europeans without any experiences of nature, love the imagination that village people, pygmies and traditional fishermen live in peace and bliss. They should invite them to exchange their places of living: Europeans to the wilderness and Africans to Europe.
What is Development?

After the publication of my column "Corruption and Development", many people criticised that - according to their point of view - corruption still contradicts development, because it is just another method to fill the pockets of a useless elite and disadvantage small national businessmen, who are the mainstay of development. I assume that this confusion was caused by a mix-up of different theories of development.

The modernisation theory and the neo-classical paradigm, which are still the leading development-trends and perspectives for Africa, focus on an industrialisation like in last century Europe. To start this industrialisation, which Rustow called 'the take-off', first a national elite, a skilled working class and a liberal economic policy have to be established. In this process omnipresent corruption and bribery like in Cameroon is seen as an effective method to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few, because a nation of shopkeepers seems to be unable to establish major industries. Some countries like Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia underlined that this development is possible, but at least their economic and political collapse earlier this year highlighted some shortcomings of this theory. Neither high mass consumption, a desired side-effect of modernity, could be established in these countries, nor could they stand for a long time within the global market. Both failures are due to the fact that none of them was able to produce a unique new product or mode of production. All of them produced consumer and utility goods like cars, electronics and clothes cheaper than in Europe and the US. This was due to the fact that labour costs were kept low by their dictatorial regimes, but after the introduction of a computerised mode of production this advantage did not count any longer. With time, more and more countries copied this modernisation and overflowed the global market with cheap products. Due to the change of the mode of production internationally, less people are employed all around the world and by that less people are able to consume these goods. The global elite, who are the winners of neoliberalism and development never consumed these goods. They love Mercedes, Sony and IBM and not no-name products. Modernisation failed due to the elimination of the middle class in the north and the competition of world market in the south, but despite of all this evidence, it still remains as the major theory of development.

The only theory which opposed modernisation was brought up as a critical approach by social scientists in South America, and was put in power also in some African counties like in Guinea, Benin and Tanzania. According to the Dependencia theory, a state has to detach itself from world market and develop its own mode of production due to its regional cultural background. But neither political, nor economical independence fills empty stomachs. Even Julius Nyerere, the old man of African Socialism, had to change his slogan from Uhuru (freedom) to Uhuru na Kaze (freedom means hard work). After some years, in most of these countries, the autonomists lost the support of their population, because the people did not want to wait till the closed market produced an autonomous development, but they wanted to consume now. In Guinea national businessmen and market-women who used to be the protagonists of auto-centric development, brought down the system, which wanted to link universal independence and national development, to become re-colonised by international capitalism.
In my opinion the primary principle of a societal development is that the people have to be the agents, the means and the end of development. To own their own development, people have to be self-reliant. Societal development can not be received, either by state administration or by foreign aid, because nothing is for free. If they provide you with development, it is their development - not yours - you are allowed to join them, if you behave like a good child. In the past, self-reliance has been largely a posture against foreign domination - a protest against being dependent and in the control of European or African rulers. This concept is pertinent, but it misses the crucial point of self-reliance. Self-reliance includes that you not only know what you are fighting against, but also what you are fighting for. It has nothing to do with ordained participation, which development agencies use to justify their work, but with a universal liberation and general consciousness. Somebody said once, that “theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp things by the root. But, for man, the root is man himself.”

In this line, corruption and bribery have been chosen by you as necessary steps towards modernisation and development - and there is nothing wrong with it, if it was chosen in awareness of all possibilities and free of all domination. I presume you were, but you should not take this too seriously, because this is just an inspection from outside.

**Education and Development**

Just before Christmas, more than one thousand students graduated at the University of Buea. What for? Some people say higher education is an important criteria for development. They say that without a skilled, literate working class no foreign company will invest in Third World Countries. Is this correct? If it would be so, there would be no reason for them to invest in Africa or in any other country, because European and American workers fulfil at least these requirements.

So why is education and especially higher education so important for the developing process? In theory, universities produce intellectuals, who try to solve the arising problems within societies in transition. These could be technical or scientific contributions. I agree with Cardinal Christian Tumi who underlined - in his speech, dedicated to Buea graduates - the importance of truth and especially the responsibility of intellectuals to bear witness to the truth. But is this admitting intellectual a common figure within African societies? In some countries they are. In some the ruling elite came to the conclusion that education and knowledge undermine their position. In these countries, government and university administration try to separate a formal ability of useful apolitical and unproblematic knowledge from real education by banning lecturers and students, who proved their ability to use knowledge as a creative force. Instead of supporting the sensitive flower of truth, they promote people, who specialise in demanding sexual favours of students and sponsor researchers, who have no relation to the problems of the people in their country. You say it is normal that lecturers “fall in love” with their students and students “fall in love” with their
lecturers. Fine, but in some countries sexual transmission of marks became the major criteria for "good" performance and a half hour in the professor's locked office yields better results than months of hard work. It has nothing to do with WASP-Ethics if I condemn education which favours pretty toy-boys and play-girls instead of knowledge and truth, because it is not a single event which contradicts the growing of truth, but the system which makes it nearly impossible for creative thinkers to survive. Education should - according to the ideals of humanism - give rise to independent and self-reliant thinking and not to subordination and slavish obedience. It is a noble ideal, which is worth fighting for, but it is neither reality nor a useful contribution for smooth development inside global capitalism. International companies only invest in countries, which offer them workers, who beside of their knowledge are cheap, obsequious and obedient. So to learn notes, dictated by a course instructor, by rote, but without understanding or to prostitute yourself is perfect preparation for an alienated life as workers within modern society.

Cardinal Christian Tumi assures us that God loves people, who pay tribute to the strength of their convictions for the truth. I can only say this: if you once join a system which promotes lies, you are at the mercy of this system forever. In some countries one calls this reproductive knowledge, which stays inside the given tracks, wisdom. Maybe it is wise not to use the human ability to think, because truth does not feed an empty stomach. Of course it is true that life is much easier for an individual who never thinks beyond the existing order, but social scientists all over the world believe that education only attaches meaning to development if education gives rise to a "ruthless criticism of the existing order, ruthless in that it will shrink neither from its own discoveries nor from conflict with the powers that be."
Pan-Africanism and Development

At the first glance there are no links between Pan-Africanism, which social scientists call an ideology, and Development, which used to be the domain of economic and political realists. But the ideal of an apolitical economy, based on nothing but realities and facts, is a transfigured fiction, created by the prevailing ideology of neo-liberalism. A thorough examination reveals that the ideals of Pan-Africanism are not limited to soap-box speeches, but are able to change the African economic and political realities fundamentally.

Pan-Africanism is nothing which has to be rebuilt and re-planned from scratch, but which has to be resurrected and filled with life by gripping the masses, if it should be more than an edifying mystery. Pan-Africanism defines itself as solidarity of the people in Africa, but after independence it became a solidarity of appeals and other statesmen's rubbish. Even the shining exception of the Anti-Apartheid-Movement proves only the rule: states who banned all official contacts with the white South Africa, ignored this ban in the economic sector.

Today Pan-Africanism is not an acting solidarity, which claims and benefits of the actors everyday and because of that, it remains as a figure of soap-box speeches. In my article “What is Development?” I claimed that “a theory is only capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates this as soon as it becomes radical.” To demonstrate Pan-Africanism ad hominem, it has to become an acting, radical solidarity of the African people. But how can this be established in an African reality, where ethnicity and regionalism are the dominant motives of everyday life? Some experts assert that to act as an united Africa, all counties have to establish themselves first as functional states and national economies within the global society. I maintain that this contradicts not only an acting pan-African solidarity, but also self-reliant development. Even if it would be possible for some countries to reach the industrial level of the tiger states, it would offer no positive effects for the majority of the population, because the key requirement of industrialisation in our days is low labour costs. Why should Africans, who - in opposition to most of the tiger states - still have enough land for farming, sell their labour for a salary, which does not allow them to feed their families - like it is in most of the tiger-states?

A more effective way would be to increase the national income by negotiating a better price for the natural resources and special African products. Today one kilo of bananas, which has to travel all the way to Europe, is there still a lot cheaper than one kilo of apples, which is growing just outside the supermarkets. This is of course not an easy or safe way. Even in international monopoly organisations, like the OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), internal conflicts and selfish momentary interests of the different national elite are used by petroleum processing companies, located in Europe and North-America. They forced down the price of Oil, which is an indispensable product for all industrialised countries, to its lowest rate in the last twenty years. A "collected self-reliant economic development", as prospected in the declarations of the Organisation of African Unity, remains wishful thinking, as long as Pan-Africanists do not understand the importance of collected actions in the economy. The Lagos Plan of Action promised a united African market by next year, but which products should be exchanged?
Do you want to use palm-oil from Senegal, just to act in a Pan-African way? And even if you would, does that speed up development? No, it would not. Pan-African solidarity only attaches meaning to economic development, if Africans, who produce the same goods, are acting in a strong sense of community on the global market. This prerequisite of self-reliant development requires a lot. As long as the national elite is able to sell natural sources for their own benefit, without even asking the people, do not think about societal development. As long as your leaders are following World Bank advisors and privatising the plantations as a form of privatising the national properties, do not think about African unity. Liberation from colonialism was seen as the main objective of old Pan-Africanism. It seems as if the main objective for a new Pan-Africanism, would be liberation from your rulers.

Nation-states and closed national economies do not have a tradition in Africa. They were brought to Africa by the Europeans as an instrument of colonialism. Traditional African societies, which are accused of being limited in their knowledge of the outside world, were acting in the economy more Pan-African than today's societies. The prices of African goods requested and used by Europeans and Arabs on the other side of the Sahara were enormous and allowed some societies to reach a higher level of development than most European societies at that time. But when the Arabs and later the Europeans established new trade routes, Africans lost their commercial advantage because they did not act in unity.

Maybe "l'Afrique refusait le développement", as Axelle Kabou asserts, but perhaps Africans are just refusing development under foreign domination. If that would be the case, Pan-Africanism is the key to the future. Pan-Africanism is not development itself, but it seems to be its prerequisite.
History and Development

In The Post No. 105 (1999-01-25), Nkeze Joseph addressed four inspiring questions about the genesis of the African economic plight to me. I will try to answer them, not only to add fuel to the fire of the ongoing discussion on the roots of corruption, but also because they are pertinent for my remarks on the future of development processes in Cameroon.

1) Was colonialism an epoch or an episode in Africa's economic history?

This seems to be more of a question for a historian than for a sociologist, because the historical science established detailed definitions of epoch and episode, but it is also quite important for the discussion on the future. To know the past is the key to future and to know the significance of European colonialism for the African societies enables us to produce a key to a better future. Colonialism varies a lot within Africa. Its significance classifies according to the interests of the colonial powers, so it is not useful to talk in general. Cameroon used to be a commercial colony and not a settlement colony like South and East Africa. In Cameroon the colonialists were only interested in cash-crop production and timber exploitation. Only very few Europeans settled with the intention to stay. Most had come here to make money and later went back to Europe. Due to that colonialism in its original meaning remains an episode for Cameroonian society, even if its consequences still restrict development. Significant negative societal results in Cameroon are the limitation of the society to a national state, the ongoing anglophone problem etc. etc. In the economy the consequences of colonialism and its mode of (non) production - exportation of raw products, without any processing - are still dominant. Only this month, after nearly thirty-nine years of independence, Cameroon tries to stop the exportation of un-transformed timber and other forest products. This answer leads already to another interesting question of Mr. Nkeze:

2) To what extent is imperialism responsible for Africa's underdevelopment?

As I said before, colonialism and imperialism transformed the traditional African society in their colony Cameroon according to their interests. The economy was changed by force from subsistence farming, hunting and gathering to cash-crop production, through the installation of plantations, and to raw product (especially timber) exportation. The infrastructure - roads, railway lines and administration - was installed according to these aims. The road between north and south is still in a worse condition than the ones leading into the forest. In the sphere of economy, imperialism is definitely responsible for the fact that Cameroon does not have any major industries. But does this mean that a country is underdeveloped? It is a European way of thinking to link development solely with industrialisation. In my article Pan-Africanism and Development (The Post No.105; p.8) I prospected a development without industrialisation, based on the fact that the world is already too over-industrialised to wait for Cameroon to show up. Take the states of the Persian Gulf as an example: they have mostly no industry at all, but one could hardly call them underdeveloped. So what hinders the Africans as opposed to Arabs to develop their own societies by realising a better price for their products? One can say, that the Europeans with their influence block all forms of self-reliant development, but
did they not block the Gulf States' development as well? Were they never colonies? It is difficult to measure the extent of the responsibility of imperialism for the African misery, but I am sure that one does not get any kind of development by arguing and by begging the Europeans for development with reference to the colonial past.

3) Is the international economic system a just one for African nations?

No! Of course the prevailing neo-liberalism is unjust and unfair, not only for the African nations but for everybody and everywhere. Justice in its philosophical meaning and economy are diametrically opposed spheres. The economic system has its own justice: the winner takes it all. To be in a huff, because the G7 play their game according to their interests and needs, is exactly the behaviour of a clueless petitioner, which is expected from you by your masters. As long as you cry and beg for justice, they give you some aid, some left-overs from their tables and some useless assistance. That is in a way just: do you allow a toothless beggar to join your table?

4) How free is the state in the Third World to choose its economic orientation?

This is a funny question! You never know how the rest of the world reacts if you develop. Your colonial masters see you still as a helpless child. Parents want their children to develop according to their interest of reproduction and they are neither amused nor happy if a child decides to go its own way. So you can not count on support from your colonial masters, if you stop begging and decide to go your own ways. It will be a hard and stony way, but it is possible to choose your own economic orientation. Even if you did not like the Soviet Union, they were the proof of a self-chosen economic orientation within a world of enemies. Even if Fidel Castro might be a dictator, Cuba, which is so close to the US and its economic pressure, bravely tries to develop according to its own way of self-reliance. A society, which fights for its freedom and self-reliant development might lose - a society which begs for justice and economic liberation has lost already.
Democratisation used to be a milestone on the path of trial and tribulation towards development. In the nineties most dictatorial regimes in Africa were transformed by force from inside out into formal democracies. In countries like Cameroon, autocratic rulers were born again as ruling democrats. The baptising IMF and World Bank were satisfied by their superficial baptismal vows, but the underlings of democratically reborn autocrats remain extremely dissatisfied. A fresh wind of change has effected their lives. New ideas were brought forward. New political parties were founded. Newspapers were struggling to inform the people of different points of view about new realities. But after some time the society started to fall asleep again. The whole society? No, some people discovered that a fresh wind still reached them in chains, even if they were not killed straight away for complaining about it. You only feel your bondage if you move, but democratic wind of change does not throw off its chains by itself. Gradually they become disappointed by democracy and started to cry for a new Kabila, who would solve all their problems at once. At this stage they became not different from their democratic autocrats. Dictators to spare.

Some of the annoyance regarding democracy seems to be cased by mixing up the different forms of democracy: Cameroonian like to be offended by political decisions from their "royal president" (Africa today; No. 299, p.24) and his villeins, but still appeal to their sovereign. The opposition asks obsequiously for talks about changes instead of fighting for them. They wait for the abdication of their "royal president" instead of forcing him to resign. They wait for a genius heir-apparent to change everything from top to bottom, or glorify the predecessor, but still recognise autocratic presidency, even if they do not recognise Biya as their president (Andrew Akonte - The Post, 1998-12-28). Social scientists call that a pseudo-democracy, an autocratic democracy or a formal democratic autocracy. This does not mean that social scientists treat this form of democracy with contempt, because it satisfies the people somehow: the complainants do not have to prove that they are able or willing to change anything about the system itself.

The European and American form of democracy is not so much different from this pseudo-democracy, because an elected government or an elected president can act autocratically, as long as his or her party has the majority in parliament and as long as the autocrat rules the party absolutely. The only - but still quite important - difference is that in Europe and America the duration of power of a single person is limited by law. Even the most beloved president has to retire after ten or so years and has to prove his or her support by the population from time to time in fair and free elections. If one examines the representative democracy as a system, one discovers that it is even more inflexible than an autocracy, because each ruler has to somehow represent a manufactured consent (Noam Chomsky). While formal democratic autocracies are still based on power and force, the media has achieved a key position in representative democracies. The opposition has to convince in open discussions that they are the better rulers, even if everybody knows that they do not care about their promises if they come to power.
A third form of democracy is a pugnacious direct democracy, which places everybody under an obligation to take care for his or her own interests on all levels of society. This is not an easy method to organise a society. But to baptise yourself as a democrat, does not change anything in your attitude towards your neighbours. If you call yourself a bird, it does not enable you to fly. Democracy in its true meaning is a life-long fight against others and their ambitions, but also against yourself and your frustration regarding others. It is of course a lot easier to compel someone to do something rather than to persuade him or her to do it. If there is no convincing your enemy, you have to convince other people in similar situations to become your allies. You only reach your aims and objectives by acting in solidarity with them. Its prerequisite is the consciousness that nobody else can achieve anything for you better than you yourself. If you collectively do not acknowledge the power of the person, who call himself your ruler, the rulers no longer can exist! To contribute to self-reliant development, democracy has to develop from a method of ruling everybody, to an omnipresent basic need of the people to participate actively in all decisions which effect them. To achieve meaning for societal development superficial democracy has to be transferred to a direct and active one.

Jorge Luis Borges asked a man from the future: "What happened to your governments?" The man answered: "According to our records they come out of fashion. They appealed for elections, collected taxes, confiscated fortunes, ordered waves of arrests and tried to push through censorship, but no-one anywhere followed their instructions. The press stopped to publish their articles and pictures. The politicians had to look for honest professions - some became excellent comedians and others started a second career as wonder-doctors."
The Privatisation of CDC

Chief Ewusi, who seems to be the speaker of south-west chiefs in their battle against CDC privatisation, said in the Herald (No. 724) that "the Germans, who began the plantation, got the land (1947) for a 60 year lease and after which the indigenes would own both land and crops therein. (...) At the end of the lease in seven years' time, the landed property therein, would become theirs, no matter the government in place." This is an interesting position, but it is far removed from historical realities.

Edwin Ardener proved in an excellent article on plantations (Kingdom on Mount Cameroon; Oxford 1996; p.151-225), that Germans started to buy land for plantations in south-west Cameroon as early as 1885. By 1900 nearly all the land of CDC was owned by different German companies, which bought it from the chiefs for almost nothing. Ardener quoted late Chief Lucas of Wonjongo, who states that "for a jar of brandy we lost all." (p.177) It is of little or no interest, if the chiefs were in a position to sell land to foreigners, because they were legally allowed to sell it. This is international law, which cannot be changed retrospectively. Even if - as most historians and anthropologists argue - the chiefs were not allowed to sell land according to their traditional laws and customs, it does not change the fact, that the population lost the opportunity to use this land, through the short-sighted avarice of their traditional leaders.

All land, which the German changed in 1896 by imperial decree without a bill of sale to crown land, was handed back at the end of German colonialism. Only estates which were founded legally and which could prove ownership of land with a bill of sale - still documented in the National Archives in Buea and Yaoundé - were taken over by the British. The majority of the plantations was bought back by Germans through auction in 1924, but they lost their estates again in 1939, when the British colonial authorities confiscated all German properties because of World War II. In 1947 the British-Nigerian Government leased the former German estates to CDC. At that time the "Bakweri Land Committee claimed the return of all alienated lands to the Bakweri tribe" (p.173), but government decided, that "the excised land should be controlled by public bodies" (p.173). After independence all Cameroonian governments shared this point of view. These are historical facts which cannot be changed, even if today the chiefs try to deny their responsibility for the whole plight by falsifying history.

If somebody does not have a legal right to ask for land, it is the chiefs. They got their power and their societal position from their colonial masters in exchange for land which did not belong to them. To this day, they desire to sell the interests of their subjects to suspicious political leaders and even foreign companies, if they benefit personally from it. What would happen, if government follows the advice of South-West chiefs and elite and hands over the CDC to Bakweri Chiefs? Either they try to kick all 'come-no-goes', Nigerians and Francophones out, only then to discover that it needs labour to run plantations, or they will sell them again to foreigners. The second option offers no difference to the plight you are in if you are not a family member of a chief. The ethnic variant offers some options: in twenty years, rainforest will cover most of the plantations, as in Bioko where it seems to be impossible to find
the former famous cocoa estates after thirty years of ethnic independence - an environment for hunters and gatherers.

My colleague Emmanuel Yenshu wishes CDC to be transformed into a joint-stock company. A strange idea in a country without a working stock exchange. Nobody who has an idea of economy will buy even one share from a company which is producing only losses. If you want to change CDC into a company which is interesting for investors, you have to change the administration. To organise CDC in a way that the benefit of the hard work of more than 20,000 plantation-workers disappears indirectly to personal accounts in France and Switzerland, privatisation is not a bad way in the world's most corrupt country. Perhaps it should be privatised into the hands of the one working there. If the government is allowed to sell CDC to the highest bidder, investors like DelMonte will take interesting parts to produce as cheaply as possible for the world market. The benefit from the sale and the profit from the privatised plantations will vanish immediately to Europe. In Russia, government privatised the natural gas company. Not one cent from this company which is worth hundreds of millions of dollars, stayed inside the country.

If you want to retain your chance for societal development, you have to fight your government to stop them from selling your natural resources for their own benefit. The privatisation of CDC is not a bad idea as such, because it takes CDC out of the hands of avaricious leaders, but it does not make much sense to change from Tweedle-Dum to Tweedle-Dee. Plantations are growing best in the hands of experts. The people who work on the estates know better than everybody else how to manage them. They are the productive force which produces the profit, so they should also get it. Why not change CDC from a useless nationalised company to a socialised property of the people living and working there?
No gift to the earth!

The Yaoundé forest summit is over. The chatterboxes went home by plane, only Prince Philip - President of the National Playing Field Association and the Commonwealth Games Federation (Post March 8th, 1999) - is searching for gifts. This gifts are donated by Paul Biya - President of the most corrupt country in the world - and were concealed from his Highness's royal eyes somewhere in the "untouched forest" of Southeast Province. Easter will be here soon. In Europe it is the tradition at Easter to search for gifts, which the Easter bunny dropped somewhere in the garden: Boys and toys! Chocolate eggs for small boys, a forest reserve for big boys. Prince Philip will pocket 880,000 hectares, which is just about the same size as Sao Tomé and Principé, a sovereign African state.

I don't want to be a spoilsport, but I am a bit jealous of his gift, which seems to be quite interesting: "the forests of Cameroon are some of the richest in the world - new birds, mammals, plants, reptiles and invertebrate species are still being discovered in these forests" says John Nchami, the information officer of WWF-CDO. I have no idea what this acronym stands for, but it must be a powerful organisation, because "WWF is calling on the Central African Governments" to do this and that. Even its declarations are "a globally important demonstration of the steps which need to be taken in order to secure the future of the world's forests." WWF wants to establish protectorates. They want to protect the Cameroonian forest from Cameroonian hunters, international logging companies and gold miners. They were able to convince President Paul Biya that the Cameroonian government is too incompetent to manage the Cameroonian forest. In 1884 the German trading company Woermann convinced King Bell, King Akwa and King Deido that the traditional leaders were incapable of managing their own territory. The Germans established the protectorate Kamerun. This was the official name of Cameroon until 1916, when the British and the French were invited by the League of Nations to protect the country from ... well from whom? Aliens, the communists, Cameroonian hunters, international logging companies and gold miners?

So nothing ever changes. At least, the traditional leaders of Douala got some good dash for their signatures: 28,000 German Marks each, which was a lot of money for 1884. But I assume that President Biya didn't take five Francs from the Prince or WWF for the giving them this new protectorate. He is a generous man. He gave 880,000 hectares of your country as a gift to a foreign racist. Some years ago the Prince went to China. He called the Chinese "slitty eyed". What will he tell his wife Elizabeth, when he comes home to Buckingham Palace after his trip to Cameroon?

You see I am really jealous and nasty, but I presume that also Prince Philip, who is still searching for his gifts - somewhere in the middle of the "untouched forest" - or even using one of his three porcelain lavatories, which were brought all the way from Britain to the Southeast, is jealous of President Biya. Joe Dinga Pefok told us in the March 8th Post that Prince Philip is the "holder of numerous honorary degrees, awards and decorations worldwide", but I am sure, that he was never awarded one by Transparency International.
I would like to know who is keeps all these gifts to the earth. The almighty God in one of his cupboards? Prince Philip under his bed, or WWF in its bank accounts? There must be some financial incentives spurring the actions of WWF - a Lord of Poverty -, because if you see it from a purely environmental perspective you will discover that all these gifts to the earth are unable to repair the damage, which the numerous planes used in this exchange of gifts caused to the global ecosystem. Joe Dinga Pefo told us, that Prince Philip is an "active and concerned conservationist and an avid wildlife photographer." As you can see from the press in Europe, Prince Philip, due to his age, always has to shoot the animals before he takes the picture. If he was a real conservationist he would blow up his palace and plant some trees there. Why did President Biya hand his gifts over to Prince Philip and not to - say King William of Victoria? This one is at least a real king and not just a small Prince searching for gifts.

According to The Post (March 8th) "Yaoundé in particular and Cameroonians at large, are anxiously waiting to see Prince Philip". Sadly, I cannot join them, because as a President Emeritus of the Worldwide Snail Racing Federation International (PE-WSRFI) I was invited to open a new racecourse in my neighbour's garden. Prince Philip did not find time to pocket this gift to the earth as well, after all - nobody pays for its opening: no helicopters, no escort service and no porcelain lavatories.

Eruption and political Changes

Mt. Cameroon was focus of an earthquake, which effected Cameroon in general. To live on the edge of a volcano is like playing with fire, but Cameroonians, and Cameroonian politicians in particular, know much about volcanoes and eruptions. In Le Messager of Tuesday March 30, 1999 the Paramount-chief of Buea HRH Endeley promised to stop the eruption. At the same time a famous "serpentologue" in Yaoundé has already proved his ability to stop "Le Volcan Hit Parade".

The first eruption of Mt. Cameroon took place - according to the records - in 1922. It was the heaviest since the first Bakweris settled in this region. The lava flow reached the ocean just outside Idenau. It was also an important year for Cameroon, because the League of Nations accepted that Britain and France split the country. The mountain which is called Cameroon erupted in anger, but Europeans never did have sensitive ears and they did not ask Efasha Moto. It is obvious that the lava flow was an illustration of the unwanted separation. Nothing happened in the next years. France and Britain kept their Cameroons quiet. The Mountain, symbol of Cameroon, fell fast asleep.

In 1954 a short but heavy eruption shook Cameroon. UPC tried to achieve immediate independence, a social state and a democratic reunification of the two Cameroons. But UPC failed to breach or rumble the political underground. The British Endeley government and the French quislings together with traditional rulers were able to kick UPC out of the country.
Dark clouds covered Cameroon and the rainy season was very heavy that year.

In 1959 an enormous eruption affected both parts of Cameroon: independence broke through the stony surface of colonialism and satisfied Cameroon with a short spring of freedom. J.N. Foncha defeated Dr. E.M.L. Endeley in the general elections in Southern Cameroons. The UN Plebiscite questions were arranged but sidelined the interests of anglophone Cameroonians. The lava flow missed Buea town by only kilometres. However, it did not reach the Mungo. When the Cameroonians rubbed the sleep out of their eyes, they discovered that in reunification there was less freedom than Ahidjo.

During the next 23 years the mountain was offended. Neither trembling and eruptions to celebrate independence, nor did he smoke the traditional pipe of presidential appointment with Ahidjo. It seemed as if Cameroon were sleeping her last sleep, as so many Cameroonians did, who - as it is said - were the best of their country.

In 1982 it was only smoke which obscured the view of Mt. Cameroon for some days. Nevertheless it was a pretty little outburst. The day after saw Cameroon in the light of a new deal. The country was fantasising in its sleep and dripping night sweat cooled down the flames of the burning Chinese palace in Yaoundé.

The flag-bearer of the new deal, who followed Ahidjo, tried to light a fire, but it was only - two years later - the CPDM. As he achieved his goals, he changed like all young men, from one who lights the fire, to one, who tries to extinguish all fires of passion.

From March 28, 1999 on the earth is trembling and Cameroon is erupting. It is now on the new 'old man' to prove if he is still a real politician: an extinguisher like the "serpentologue" in Yaoundé or just another promiser like his auxiliary from the slopes of Mt. Cameroon.
Paul and the gangs

The political masquerade is over. The promiser came all the way from Yaoundé - or was it Baden-Baden - and nothing happened. The roads were blocked for ordinary citizens for two days, while the Lava is still flowing down towards the ocean. Finally, under the guise of a political volcanologist the people of Buea discovered a warped car-fetishist. Even the last forces of god, the born-again dictators and evangelists, were unable to stop the eruption of the Mountain called Cameroon. The Cameroonian "Ministry of External Relations" is now searching for a volcanologist from abroad. Their own seem to be stumped.

Theatre mundi raises its curtains: We see Paul and his gang totally naked in front of Mount Fako. Chief Endeley still carries out the traditional albino-libations on the volcano. In one corner the Minister of External Relations tries to organise a real volcanologist from abroad via fax, and also radios, overalls, boots, underwear and caps for the "gangs ceintures" (we know them as Pauls gang). - If you think this is a fake: It is the MINAT-fax No. 0999 from April 7th 1999, fax number 223735. - What are these items to evacuation gang-members who even do not have underwear or caps bearing the smiling face of their patron? Do you think they are able to evacuate even a single person?

In that fax appealing to all foreign-embassies for international aid the Cameroonian "Ministry of External Relations" listed: "2.500 tents for 15.000 people, 15.000 gas-masks (unmask yourself stranger!), 7.500 beds, 7.500 mattresses, 37.500 l of water, 7.500 blankets, 5 generators, 1.500 toilets (do not take the three of Prince Philip), 1.500 wash-basins, 450 maize mills, 450 manioc mills, 250.000 kg of maize, 250.000 kg of rice, 250.000 kg of beans, 125.000 kg of peanuts (chop grainuts so mimbo no di catch you), 37.500 l of palm oil (the one from Europe is better than the one from Pamol), 45.000 kg of salt, 125.000 kg of smoked fish (get it from Europe, we do not have it in Cameroon), 120.000 kg of meat (please do not send your mad cows, we prefer mad politicians), 2.500 petroleum-stoves, 12.500 l of petroleum (but do not ask SONARA), 48.000.000 g of soap and 75.000 l of disinfectant soap ("I love to wash my hands" Prontus Paul) and finally 60.000.000 FCFA for school-fees.

If you think that is a lot of stuff, you have to remember that you live in the world's most corrupt country. 50% will get lost in the "Ministry of External Relations". 50% will disappear in the ministry of transport, because the convoy towards Bakingili will use public roads, 50% will be charged by the airport authorities, another 50% by the governor of Littoral and 50% as a token for the mayor of Douala. 50% will be pocketed by the gendarmes, 50% by the police, 50% by the secret police, 50% by the army, 50% by the air force, and 50% by the marines. 50% is the contribution for the governor of South West Province, 50% for the mayor of Buea, 50% for the mayor of Limbe, 50% for the parliamentarian in charge of Bakingili, 50% for Chief Endeley, 50% for King William and 50% for the Chief of Bakinili. 50% for CPDM, 50% for CPDM-Women and 50% for the CPDM-Youth.

In the end the victims of the eruption will only get a 1/2.097.152 (a two-million-ninety-seven-thousand-one-hundred
and fiftieth) of the foreign donations. A small piece of a tent, two beans and 29 FCFA etc. So it is good that in the end there is only one real victim of the eruption of Mount Cameroon, who has to be evacuated to Paris. I think his name is Paul.

P.S. Some friends and colleagues advised me to clarify that Paul is an electrician, who enlightens our house with his famous smile, and not, as might be assumed, the President of Cameroon. For me - and I guess the majority of the Cameroonians - this is clear as mud, because who would name such a charismatic and noble person as the highly honoured and decorated President of Cameroon by his first name? For us the first name is reserved for friends.

**Ethnicity and Democracy**

The death of Dr. John Ngu Foncha is used as an excuse for several attempts at revival of the discussion on anglophone problems and ethnic politics. Most of these articles claim that the population of anglophone Cameroon is discriminated against because of their ethnic identity. If people collectively establish an image of something, it appears to the actors as an object of reality and should be treated as such.

In Rwanda the colonial powers established the Hutus and Tutsis as ethnic groups. This image gripped the masses, which were bored to death by and discontented with their dictatorial regime - like in so many other countries all over the world. To moan about discrimination never ever satisfied anyone who feels discriminated against, but intensifies hate and envy of their suspected oppressors. An eruption is only a question of time.

In Rwanda, people hid their destructive needs within the crude ethnic-conflicts, because nothing is easier than to find an abstract reason for the satisfaction of personal needs. While capitalism only provides such individuals the possibility of unlimited economic oppression, the ideology of ethnicity offers them a justification for rape, murder, torture, bombing, ruining, vandalising and all other actions which satisfy them. The destructive needs become virtually invisible, because culprits and victims are concealed in their ethnicity-rhetoric. Adelman and Suhrke (Rwanda: Death, despair and defiance; London 1995) pointed out that even an ethnic-based genocide with the ideal to slaughter all members of an ethnic group does not explain why most corpses were brutally dismembered after the
killing. It is obvious that people used the storm of violence to get rid of their negative emotions and to reconcile themselves with their nation. They cherished unfounded hopes. At the day after the storm a dictatorial regime was running their country, life is as boring and lousy as before.

Antoine de Rivarols put this fact into words: “The ethnic groups are as susceptible to slaughters, massacres and bloodbaths as the shiny iron is susceptible to rust. Ethnic groups and iron, both are shiny only on their surface. You can clean them after usage and they will be shiny again.” My colleague and friend Francis Nyamnjoh states now, that “Cameroon should scrap political parties and legalise ethnic groupings” (The Herald; No. 743). On the one hand this only re-allocates an unloved reality to an aim of society and on the other hand, it does not offer any answer to the question: how ethnic pluralism should exist in a surrounding, which is definitively not a pluralistic democracy. In some countries like Switzerland ethnic pluralism is working in a harmonised and organised form of democracy, but in Africa this idea seems to be related to the traditional one-party-state and his way of organising a society. And this is the main critique, which Nyamnjoh wants to launch: SDF and CPDM are still only two ethnic groups in a semi-dictatorial regime. On the one hand his critique is right, because it seems impossible to analyse programmatic differences between these two parties, but on the other hand, what are his options? European democracy is only the dictatorial regime of the so-called democratic parties and for an organised and democratic ethnic pluralism it is important to be established in an harmonic and peaceful environment. A lot of people believe that ethnic segregation will end ethnic stratification, but on the day after independence, they will discover that they only lost somebody to complain about. The reasons, which make them search for a whipping boy, still remain the same.

It is an interesting idea to envisage that CPDM and SDF will reunite like the KNDP of Dr. Focha and the UC of Ahidjo in 1966, but why should a new one-party-state satisfy the people more than the CNU and CPDM?

It is the same dialectic as with the Christian church: Most prefer to ignore the dark side of religion, but "the blood, which was shed by the followers of the almighty and merciful God is more than enough to drown all human beings on this planet" (Percy B. Shelley). Ethnicity and religion are two lamentations of the pained creature, which do not satisfy its needs when the refreshing thunderstorm of violence escapes.
A cage of fools!

I had a dream. A dream in which the new UB wall of perception was used as boundary of a madhouse, which called itself University of Buea. A deranged doorman called Herbert dipped his jester's cap courteously to all those passing his kennel, but at the end of the day he requested from each visitor a dash of 50%. An old lady carried the fool's sceptre, but most of the time she was just drivelling about some kind of naked dressing, which she was afraid to wear herself, because of her short legs. Nobody wants to see a liar naked, but to say that we hate naked dressing is a lie.

In one faculty squirts and quarrelsome gnomes were called officers, in another a toothless old lecher was acting as vice-dean. The libraries were empty, but the personal bank accounts full. One day a warped car-fetishist visited the mountain and all students were requested to clap, but when the winner of the elections came, nobody was allowed to welcome him. Lecturers with an intelligence above outside temperature were administratively lynched, while members of the Clownish Party - Dungeon Masters were confessing tittle-tattlers and highly promoted.

In my dream one day there was an eruption. Workers were ordered to build a ten meter high wall with spring-guns around the centre of academic administration. They wanted to protect the flag-bearers of knowledge and wisdom against the mob of students, lectures and other useless creatures. The workers waited till all fools were inside the walls and then they walled up the last doors. The people inside did not miss us and we did not miss them. Inside their cage, they built up a party-university - without students and lecturers, but with excellent results and international contacts to all major universities such as Kiribati (Kiribati) and Ratatonga (Ratatonga). We - the people outside the walls - had the chance to establish a University, which was really a place to be: A place where the limited monetary sources were used after a democratic process, in which all effected groups participate, for the needs of a University. A place where people were discussing freely and in all public about the future. A place where academic excellency was promoted and able to grow. A place which was worth calling a University.

Dreams are but shadows - but sometimes they are a necessary step to open up your mind and to imagine a reality which is worth fighting for. Sometimes it is the other way round: Your dreams are so nice, that on the next morning you hardly like to wake up and fight for your ideals. So we remain in a fools' cage, where the ability to read and write is not requested, and where the insurmountable walls of ignorance are the most remarkable doors of perception.
Civil Society and Conflict Management

In today's world moral norms - whether based on tradition, convention, or belief - appear unable to provide the means by which human beings can live together without conflict. The often prospected civil society, which offers resolutions for all sorts of conflict, has to be understood as a transfigured fiction, while conflict management seems to be the measure of all things.

It is a fact that the competing interests and needs, arising from pressures generated by economic and social problems, can no longer be satisfied within the limits of the existing moral order. The question arises then if only authoritarian governmental structures have the capacity to control these destructive needs and interests to a great enough extent that a physically safe and materially secure existence could be guaranteed to a majority of human beings? Dictatorial regimes all over Africa claim to protect their population against violence and corruption, which is actually produced by them. The answer to the question is clear: A security based on nothing but force is a false one, insofar as it is based not on the elimination of violence as a solution to individual and inter-group conflicts, but rather on the negation of the freedom to satisfy and to express individual needs. The dialectic of the irrational remains silent in the garrulous relationship, while violence arises from the silent inner strife of men. Silence, which is produced by the insurmountable walls of ignorance and a significant symbol of all dictatorial regimes, does not pacify a society but gives rise to eruptions.

According to this outline it seems as if human society as a whole could only live in peace, if the origins of destructive tendencies were successfully identified and expressed in public, because the underlying causes of war and power conflicts might be solved. The societal processes in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Northern Chad and the two Congo could serve as examples for areas, in which governmental processes and morality no longer prevent individuals from satisfying their own destructive needs. In these societies, the false peace of civil societies does not exist, but is replaced by structural anarchy. Many researchers are of the view that this structural anarchy will become increasingly widespread in the future. It is in view of this potential of anarchy that I want to use some examples of societies on prospect to demonstrate that there is a lot of dynamism, progress and challenge embodied in what superficially occurs as simple riot and conflict.

In Tubu society in Northern Chad destructive needs hardly become visible, because the hyper egoistic way of living, which seems to be the result of existence on the dark side of moon, prevents the individuals from each form of sympathy. If someone even kills someone else just for fun, a Tubu will neither ask for reasons nor for punishment but pay tribute to the murder's boldness. In interactions without any form of societal consciousness the category of destructive needs only arises meaning for strangers, who have the useless notion to search behind actions for a comprehensible meaning, which is in the view of the Tubu a lunacy.

In the case of Congo-Kinshasa, the idea of liberation features merely as a justifying argument for slaughtering members of the Mobuto clan, even though everybody was aware that his
power would soon come to an end and was not used in its original meaning as a concept for organising a better future. In Congo-Brazzaville the masses used the conflict between a pro-American and a pro-French government to launch a riot in which destructive needs detonate like a heavy rain after the long and hot days of oppression. Actually, these riots can be understood as an incomplete and unorganised prospect on what I would call a modern and participatory form of peace and security in a developing world, even though some people were involved without their consent in it.

Allow me to use a last example. The University of Buea is building a wall around their campus. Students and lecturers complain about this vast sum of money and even start to call UB-administration a "cage of fools", which try to hide behind their walls of ignorance. Their is no easy conflict resolution existing. Different groups fight for different interest. While students and the majority of the lecturers supported by the elected mayor of Buea want to use their limited monetary sources for an improvement of the terrible teaching facilities - for a library with books, for photocopy-machines with paper and some new amphitheatres - the appointed university administration wants to use their money for their needs and interests. Some people adore academic excellency, others white elephants. There are different options of conflict management existing: In a dictatorial regime the administration would just continue with their project till eruptions and trembling break down their walls of ignorance and burn the paper tigers. In a civil society the different sides would discuss till a resolution is found. But what is your option, what is the African option, what is the Cameroonian option?

Individual freedom and social harmony - the basic ideals behind the civil society - are not mutually exclusive and peace and security are more than mere theoretical models, but a civil society requires self-confidence. A self-reliant confidence, which is not based on the environment of force and corruption, but on the strength of arguments. It is definitely easier to hide behind walls of ignorance than to discuss all societal problems in public, but only an open and free expression of all involved sides is able to prevent eruptions. Eruptions, which will shake not only the Mountain called Cameroon but Africa in its entirety. The walls of ignorance will fall, either by sense or by violence. It is up to you to choose your option.
Academic Repression in Cameroon
Critique is a progressive force

Dear Dr. Lambi

17th December 1998

Today I received your letter, from 23rd November (Ref. 5002/75-4/UB/M000). I am completely surprised and somehow shocked about the severity in your letter. I thought that our relationship would allow us to discuss this kind of problem face to face and not through the exchange of formal letters. Why did you not use the chance to talk to me in the “good old” anglophone academic manner during the last weeks? I think, if you would have used this normal way of communication between a Dean and one of his lecturers, some of your critique could have been smoothened out immediately.

You remind me that corruption is not a phenomenon which exists only in Cameroon. This is exactly the position outlined in my article: "If the citizen wants something from his rulers, he has to pay for it. Some administrations call their bribe ‘processing fees’ and offer receipts, some do not. (...) If state-administration wants your money, you have to pay immediately all over the world. In some countries they produce laws to obtain it, in some they wait just outside towns to collect it."
You criticise that I denigrate the African system of governance. I deny this. I praised the "outstanding example for good governance" in the Republic of Congo and I underlined that "such a sustainable piece of marketing is only possible in a country like Cameroon".

You criticise that I "throw parochial and unverified criticisms on the government". But what is the intention of critique? Why did you criticise my article? I think you criticised me, with the intention to improve my knowledge, such that it puts me in a position "to show Cameroonians an alternative way ahead". And I agree with your critique. Even before I received your letter, I started to concretise my position, as you can see in the forthcoming article attached. You criticised my article to enable me to improve my position and I criticised some shortcomings in the Cameroonian society with the same intention. One of the founding fathers of sociology pointed out, that "criticism is not a passion of the head but the head of passion" and I think he was right. We criticise something not with the intention to destroy it, but with the intention to improve it.

One of your major points of critique was that I harmed the University of Buea by indicating, that I am a lecturer there. I cannot follow your argument in that point, because in all democratic countries, the freedom of speech includes that everybody is allowed to point out his societal position. On each book and in front of each article which lecturers publish all over the world they introduce themselves not only by using their names, but also by using their academic positions. If this is not allowed in Cameroon, I am sorry, but nobody told me that and even in the same newspaper - which is not a radical or half-legal pamphlet, but is awarded as the best English newspaper in Cameroon - students and lecturers introduce themselves as I did.

I hope that our productive and, for me, always inspiring discussions are not undermined by such needless misunderstandings. You know that I am not your enemy but a friend of Cameroon, who has still to learn a lot about your society.

Looking forward to hearing from you, I remain,

Yours faithfully,

Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltan
German Lecturer expelled for denigrating Biya
by Clovis Atatah

A German national, lecturer in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of the University of Buea, UB, cum columnist at The Post, Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau, was, Friday May 28, dismissed for, among other things, “denigrating” President Paul Biya.

A letter of termination of appointment, signed by the University of Buea Vice Chancellor, Dr. (Mrs.) Dorothy Njeuma, did not specify any instances when Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau denigrated President Biya, though it is understood that she is referring to his regular column, Inspections From Outside, in The Post. Dr. (Mrs.) Dorothy Njeuma also levelled a catalogue of accusations against the German national, including one that he attempted to incite students and staff to violence.

“You have engaged not only in denigrating the authorities of Cameroon, including the Head of State, the entire nation of Cameroon and the University of Buea, but also in attempting to incite students and staff of our institution to violence through your barrage of insulting and tendentious newspaper articles and your lectures,” Dr. (Mrs.) Njeuma states. “We find such impudence, calumny and subversion most unacceptable. We are, therefore, constrained to terminate your part-time appointment at the University of Buea with immediate effect.”

The UB Vice Chancellor further bars Dr. Kai, “from entering the campus of the University of Buea henceforth.” She added: “We finally wish to let you know that the termination of your appointment does not preclude any legal action that may be taken against you.”

In an immediate reaction to the termination of his appointment at the University of Buea, Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau debunked the accusations levelled against him, saying they are simply ridiculous. “It is crazy,” he said in despair. “It is actually crazy.”

Dr. Kai said, in an interview granted The Post, Friday, May 28, that he believes the main reason for his expulsion was his criticism of the current construction of the fence along the University of Buea corridor.

“UB has very limited financial resources,” he said. “There are different interests within the university. Students and lecturers are mostly interested in getting a good library, working copy machines and more classrooms. But some people want to build a fence. There is a conflict and I think we have to manage this conflict. But what is the reason for this fence now? Building a 4 km fence is just a waste of money.”

He regretted that the University of Buea shuns democratic means of resolving conflicts. “It seems they are just using authoritarian methods to get their way and that is all,” Dr. Kai said.

The German national, who says he has been in the country for two years and was lecturing at the University of Buea for free, considers his expulsion completely unjustified. “The University of Buea is a place for academics, and the main accusation against me relates to my articles and column in The Post,” he
said. “It has no relation with the university. In each democratic society in the world, you are allowed to publish whatever you like outside campus if you are working inside. The most important thing is academic standards and quality. And there was no complaint about that.”

On the accusation that he denigrated Cameroonian authorities, including the Head of State, the German national said: “I find that very vague. And I don’t know the relevance for the university to be talking about these issues. I don’t see any relation between this and academics. In a normal democratic country, I can say whatever I like about the Head of State, outside the campus, without any problem at all. But in Cameroon, it is somehow different and I don’t understand why.”

Dr. Kai, who has lectured in several universities around the world, blasted the UB administration for converting the institution into a party university. He said that, normally, politics is not practised within universities all over the world. “But the problem now in Buea,” he lamented, “is that inside the campus, there is politics, but only the politics of the CPDM (...) There is no real possibility for lecturers, other than CPDM people, getting promoted. It is a matter of trying to promote the CPDM and trying to bury everything which is against.”

He also denied the accusation that he was inciting students and lecturers to violence, arguing that when he is in class, he discusses nothing but academics.

The sociologist also regretted that his students would suffer because his termination came just two weeks before the end of lectures. “The Vice Chancellor is not thinking about students at all,” he said. “She is just thinking about not losing face.”

Even before Dr. Kai’s expulsion, sources within the University of Buea told The Post, Dr. (Mrs.) Dorothy Njeuma had been hatching plans to get rid of the German national. The UB Vice Chancellor, who did not query Dr. Kai before her final action, reportedly complained that he was too critical of the New Deal regime. As early as February this year, rumours circulating within administrative circles at the University of Buea indicated that Dr. (Mrs.) Njeuma had confided in close aides to terminate Dr. Kai’s appointment.

Matters came to a head, last May 17, when Dr. Kai, in his column, Inspections From Outside (The Post No. 121), lampooned the UB administration, for constructing a “wall of ignorance” around the university. Sources at the University of Buea revealed that the Vice Chancellor was furious. She reportedly made several copies of the article and distributed them to her closest aides.

Then on May 25, during the OAU 36th anniversary celebrations, at the University of Buea, Dr. (Mrs.) Njeuma decided she could no longer contain her disdain for Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltu. When he was just about to present a paper on “The Civil Society And Conflict Resolution In Africa”, the Vice Chancellor convinced Governor Acham Peter, who was also present, to leave the hall. As they left, together with the Governor’s entourage, the hall was gripped by rowdy excitement. Then Dr. Kai paused and observed: “Some people may say you don’t need Inspections From Outside. But can a sick person insist to talk only to himself?” He went ahead in his
analysis of the role of the civil society in conflict resolution, using the construction of the UB fence as one of his examples, amidst deafening applause from the lecturers and students present.

When Dr. (Mrs.) Njeuma later learnt about it, The Post gathered, she was more than enraged. She reportedly summoned close aides, blaming the University of Buea OAU Club for allowing the critical lecturer to present a paper and swearing that the last thing she could take is being humiliated by a foreigner. Three days later, her sledgehammer landed on Dr. Kai with a bang.

This is not the first time a UB lecturer is victim of Dr. (Mrs.) Dorothy Njeuma’s ire. Some of them include Dr. Ndiva Mbua (whose crime was militating vocally in the SDF), Dr. Ben Jua, Dr. Fondo Sikod and Dr. Francis Nyamnjoh.

“This general arrogance and high-handedness in the way Dr. (Mrs.) Dorothy Njeuma and the Registrar, Herbert Endeley, run the University of Buea as if it were a private plantation in Batoke, has marred their relationship with everybody,” a lecturer who pleaded anonymity told The Post, Friday. “Nobody is motivated to do the right thing in teaching and research.” Another lecturer, who spoke to The Post after a lot of convincing, for fear of possible reprisals, blurted: “Almost everybody is disgusted with the place. It is being run like a glorified nursery school.”

“It is really a society of fear at the University of Buea,” Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau lamented.

Dorothy Njeuma sévit: Un coopérant allemand chassé de l’université de Buea
Tientcheu Kameni

Madame le recteur n’appréciait pas ses critiques à l’endroit des autorités camerounaises. L’université de Buea vient de mettre brutalement fin aux enseignements du Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltau enseignant d'anthropologie et de sociologie à la faculté des sciences sociales et de management de cette institution.

Dans une correspondance du 28 mai dernier, Mme Dorothy Njeuma, recteur de cette université lui signifiait en des termes très durs, la fin de son contrat. "Nous avons noté, écrit-elle, qu’au lieu de promouvoir une coopération fructueuse telle qu’indiquée dans votre demande d’emploi de septembre 1997, vous êtes engagé dans une entreprise de dénigrement non seulement des autorités camerounaises y compris le chef de l’état, la nation tout entière mais aussi l’université de Buea. Par ailleurs, vous essayez d’inciter les étudiants et les enseignants de cette institution à la violence lors de vos cours ainsi que par le truchement d’articles tendancieux et insultants dans la presse. Nous trouvons une telle imprudence, calomnie et subversion inacceptables. Nous sommes donc dans l’obligation de mettre fin à votre contrat de vacation qui vous liait à l’université de Buea immédiatement.” Le lettre de Mme Njeuma interdit au Dr. Schmidt-Soltau, tout accès à l’université de Buea, précisant que toutes ces mesures sont prises sans préjudice des poursuites légales qui pourraient intervenir.

En fait, ce qui est reproché à cet Allemand âgé d'une quarantaine d’années, c’est qu’il dit tout haut ce que tout le monde pense tout bas. Dès son arrivée à l’université, il prenaît une journal local “The Post”. Très vite, il y sollicite l’animation d’une chronique intitulée “Inspection from Outside”. Dans celle-ci, il passe régulièrement quelques tares de
la société africaine et camerounaise en particulier au scanner de sa critique: 'Corruption and Development', 'The Development of Democracy', 'The Privatisation of CDC'. Mais surtout, il écrit une série sur l'éruption du Mont Cameroun qui ne plaît pas à tout le monde 'Eruptions and political change'. 'Paul's eruption politics'. Les derniers écrits qui auraient vraisemblablement mis le feu aux poudres datent du 17 mai dernier. Dans sa chronique intitulée 'A cage of fools' le Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltan s'en prend vertement au staff dirigeant de l'université de Buea qu'il accuse de construire un mur autour de cette institution pour embrigader les esprits alors que l'université manque de tout, de amphithéâtres, des photocopieurs et même du papier.

Réponse de la bergère au berger: le 25 mai dernier, lors d'une conférence publique à laquelle assistaient le gouverneur de la province du Sud-Ouest, le recteur ainsi que toutes les autorités de la province sur l'OUA et les mécanismes de gestion des conflits en Afrique, le Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltan s'apprête à prendre la parole dans le panel des intervenants. Il a à peine commencé la lecture de son texte que Mme Njeuma sort de la salle, suivie presque aussitôt par le gouverneur et tout le parterre des invités officiels. Le président du club OUA de l'université de Buea qui a eu le toupet d'inviter à cette rencontre le Dr. Schmidt-Soltan, est prié de présenter des excuses publiques. Des enseignants de 'université de Buea se plaignent en privé de la gestion à poigne de Mme Njeuma de l'université de Buea. Certains parlent de 'loi martiale' cependant que d'autres affirment qu'ils vivent dans une espèce d'état d'urgence larvée. Dorothy Njeuma quant à elle, continue son bonhomme de chemin et des vents contraires affirment également que mis à part ce côté dictatorial, l'université de Buea n'en reste pas moins l'une des mieux gérées du pays.

**Cameroon Government Is Producing Violence**

Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltan, the German lecturer who was expelled from the University of Buea, May 28, for denigrating the authorities of Cameroon, including the Head of State, inciting staff and students to violence, among other reasons, has accused the New Deal regime of producing violence. In an interview granted The Post last May 28, the German national said there would eventually be an explosion in Cameroon if the government fails to change its tactics. He also spoke about the political situation in Cameroon, his expulsion from the University of Buea as well as other pertinent issues. He was interviewed by Clovis Atatah. Excerpts:

**The Post**: Do you think your expulsion from the University of Buea is justified?

**Dr. Kai Schmidt-Soltan**: Of course not. The university is a place for academics. And the main accusation against me relates to my articles and column in The Post. It has no relation with the university. In each democratic society in the world, you are allowed to publish whatever you like outside campus if you are working inside. The most important thing is academic standards and quality. And there was no complaint about that. My lectures related to academics. And outside campus, what I am doing should be of no interest to the university.

Are you sure in your lectures, you did not, in one way or another, criticise the university administration or the authorities in Cameroon?

Sociology is a critical science. It requires people to think. Of course, if you start to think, you will likely criticise. So, it is very difficult to teach Sociology without introducing the
students to critical thinking. If the University of Buea doesn’t want this, then they should close down the Department of Sociology. Of course, it is “subversive” to think. But if this is enough to expel somebody from the university, then we should not call the place a university.

Were there no internal channels through which you could disagree with the authorities of the university without resorting to public criticism?

That is very possible. But this is exactly how you are required to behave in a dictatorship. In a democracy, each side in a conflict is allowed, and even encouraged, to articulate their views in public. And I think Cameroon is claiming to be a democracy, so there should be no problem expressing one’s views.

Did you receive any query relating to your criticisms, or did the university administration alert you that they did not like what you were doing?

When I published my first article on corruption in The Post, I had an academic discussion, through letters, with my Dean, Dr. Cornelius Lambi. But this was only an academic discussion. He criticised certain aspects of my analysis on corruption. After my reply, he even sent a letter thanking me for the reply, adding that he highly appreciated the discussion.

You spoke about democracy and dictatorship. Do you have the impression that there is dictatorship at the University of Buea?

Well, I would not put it that way. But it seems, more and more, that the University of Buea shuns the normal way of solving conflicts in democratic societies and institutions; that is, through open discussions. The university administration only uses authoritarian methods to get its way and that is all. So, at the moment, we can say it is not a dictatorship, but the university administration is using dictatorial methods to solve its problems.

Do students and lecturers have channels of free expression and do they participate in management?

I think there is no participation at all. There is a senate, but some members of the senate tell me that everything is stage-managed. They just have to raise their hands and clap and that is all. The students are not even asked about the development of the university. The whole surrounding is mostly organised by fear. It is really a society of fear at the University of Buea. So you can’t really talk of participation.

In your contentious article in The Post, you claimed that UB is a party university. How do you mean?

There is no real possibility for lecturers, other than CPDM people, getting promoted... And official statements and decrees from the university are always in favour of the CPDM. It is a matter of trying to promote the CPDM and trying to bury everything which is against.

As someone who is widely travelled and who has taught in other universities, is UB the only university in which party politics is practised?

Normally, politics is outside of the university and academics inside. There is normally no relation between academics and politics. But the problem now at the University of Buea is that inside campus, there is politics and only the politics of the CPDM.

In your contentious article, still, you criticised UB for constructing a fence. Is this justified, given that most universities in the world are surrounded by fences?

The University of Buea has very limited resources. There are many interests. Students and lecturers are mostly interested in a good library, working copy machines and more classrooms. But other people want to build a fence. I think there is a conflict and
we have to manage this conflict. But what is the reason for this fence now? Building a 4 km fence is just a waste of money. *How can you assess the quality of academics vis-à-vis other universities?*

It is mostly related to individuals. You have excellent scholars in Cameroon. But these excellent scholars mostly have a critical view of things, created by the ability to think. So, these people mostly have political problems in Cameroon. *In your letter of termination, you are also accused of denigrating the Head of State. How do you react to that?*

I find that very vague. And I don’t know the relevance for the university talking about these issues. I don’t see any relation between this and academics. In a normal democratic country, I can say whatever I like about the Head of State outside campus, without any problems at all. But in Cameroon, it is somehow different and I don’t understand why. *Are you going to appeal against the decision expelling you from the University of Buea?*

Well, I have not yet thought about that. In the letter, the Vice Chancellor also indicates that they will probably start some legal action against me. So, I am, therefore, going to try to get some more information about it. But this is crazy. It is actually crazy. *But do you agree that you denigrated the Head of State?*

I criticise the Head of State. But I do not denigrate him. I did some critical analysis of certain aspects of his actions with the aim of, maybe, making Cameroon better. The idea of my criticisms is not to destroy Cameroon or incite people to violence as suggested in my letter of expulsion. The title of my column is Inspections From Outside. My idea is that though Cameroonians have an idea, other people are thinking about Cameroon. And this is a form of conflict management. *Does your expulsion from UB give you any idea about the political situation in Cameroon?*

It seems as if the ruling party is trying to consolidate its power after the short period of mass demonstrations in the early 1990s, which marked a small democratic opening, by closing this gate again. They just want to go back to their old ways which, to me, is not fruitful at all. *In your articles, you generally examine one or two aspects of the political situation in Cameroon. How can you assess Cameroon politically in a nutshell?*

I’ve been in Cameroon now for more than two years. So, I have a lot of friends. Through their initiatives in other areas, I have been doing some research about Cameroon which I publish, not only in The Post, but also, in academic journals. So, I really have some ideas about Cameroon. I’ve been working on Africa for more than ten years in research, lectures and so on. So, if I have some different ideas from some Cameroonians, it is because I know other countries; I know a country can be run in a different way. A country does not need to run like this. *What different ways are you really talking about?*

I’m talking about freedom of speech, basic rights, human rights and other democratic tenets. If you look at other Central African countries, you can say they have a different difficult way towards democracy. But, at least, they’re trying everyday. The university should always be the flag-bearer of democracy, because, their view is the elitist view; and these are the people to run the country in the future. This is even the reason why the ruling party is trying to fight against all forms of criticism inside the university. It is afraid people are beginning to think. *Do you mean Cameroon is retrogressing as far as democratisation is concerned?*

You can say the process of democratisation in Cameroon has
simply stopped.

In your paper presented at the University of Buea during the occasion of the 36th anniversary celebration of the OAU, you seemed to have come to the conclusion that the civil society is an essential component in conflict resolution. Do you think the civil society is participating in the governing of Cameroon?

I can’t really see conflict resolution strategies from the ruling side. I’ve been accused of inciting people to violence. But it is the ruling side which is producing violence, because they are not open to discussions. If you are never allowed to voice out your opinion, and you are always ordered before you do something, then you just explode. And this is what happened in Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa. One day, people were just fed-up with oppression. They just started to get violent.

In this light, would you predict an imminent outbreak of violence in Cameroon?

It is difficult to predict violence. A good friend of mine was in Rwanda when they started slaughtering each other. He said all scholars at the university were not aware of it a week or even a few days before it started. This is because it was a silent society - dictatorial silence. You really can’t predict violence. It just starts like something small, but, suddenly, it is an outbreak. You can’t stop it at all. And, of course, there are so many conflicts in Cameroon. My fear is that the government is not interested in conflict management. If it continues this way, there would be an explosion. This is not good for the entire society because many people will get killed and many things will be destroyed.

Do you think corruption engenders conflict in Cameroon?

Yes. Corruption is so terribly common in Cameroon. Everybody knows that Cameroon is number one on the World Bank’s list of corrupt countries. Take the example of the University of Buea. It is quite common and possible to get a degree without working at all. Either you use money or you use sexually transmitted marks, which is so common. And this is a form of corruption.

Will you continue writing?

Of course, I will continue writing as long as there is no legal injunction. But to the best of my knowledge, there is no law which stops anybody from publishing his ideas.
Kai Schmidt-Soltau, lecturer of German nationality who was recently sacked from the University of Buea for 'subversive lectures' says what reigns in the University of Buea today is academic repression and dictatorship.

Dr. Schmidt-Soltau, who was lecturing Sociology at the University for free, accused Dorothy Njeuma, Vice-chancellor of the Buea University who terminated his appointment, of being unable to manage conflicts. The sociology lecturer who is also a consultant in social and economic studies threatened to seek legal redress against Njeuma for accusing him of denigrating the head of state and the entire Cameroon nation. He spoke to Ezieh Christopher in Buea.

You have just been served with a letter terminating your appointment as lecturer in the Buea University. What is your reaction?

Well, of course I am surprised about it. But I am not satisfied with the letter and this points to the lack of conflict management in the university administration. In conflict management both sides should be able to have the possibility to express their points of view in public.

As for my reaction, in fact, there was no warning nor caution from the University authority concerning my articles and lectures. The action as I view it is typical of an administration which is not democratic.

Do you imply your termination was not in order?

Definitely, that is my impression because there is no argument or reason for my termination. The decision is undemocratic, illegal and uncalled-for. Actually, it is unacademical.

But the reason are stated in the letter terminating you?

The reasons are lame and frivolous. The reasons do not tie with academics. In all universities all over the world, termination of appointments of lecturers can only be effected purely on academic reasons.

What were the conditions of your appointment?

That I was to offer free service and I started working with them in October 1997 on no cost of charge. The only cost or charge I expected was that the institution would act as a truly academic institution.

From the initial stage, that expectation arose after my discussion with the former Deputy Vice-chancellor, Prof. Beban Chumbow, and the Dean of Social and Management Sciences.

In your application to teach in the university, you described the institution as a highly recommended institution, and today you call it an institution of repression. Is that not contradictory?

I described it "high recommended" from what people said. But what transpires in there is not a reflection of what is portrayed to the public. General opinion is that the university is a model, but let me remind you that it is the direct opposite of that view. What reigns there is academic repression and dictatorship.

Your termination is partly connected with a lecture you delivered on the 36th anniversary celebration of the OAU in the University from which the vice-chancellor had to stage a walk-out.

It is true. I started making newspaper contributions in November last year as an attempt to prove the sociological science of practice which can go a long way to promote
sociology in Cameroon as a science. A modest contribution which I think was appreciated by both students and staff but also the general public. But curiously, the central administration has branded it as subversive academics. As concerns the strange behaviour of the vice-chancellor to stage a walk-out during my OAU celebration's lecture I simply viewed it as her inability to manage conflicts. As far as I know, only politicians and diplomats stage walk-outs and not academics. Academics stay to listen and challenge what has been put forward. In a nutshell, it was an uncultured behaviour coming from the head of an academic institution such as Buea.

In your termination letter you stand accused of inciting staff and students to violence. What do you have for your defence? I introduced my students into the process of thinking. And I can't really believe this is seen as subversion even if the outcome does not satisfy the university administration. All I am guilty of is having introduced my students to the culture of rigorous and critical thinking which is the culture of academics. If the vice-chancellor should find it subversive, then the world remains to be told what her idea of a university is.

My writing were to address issues I considered dear to Cameroonian. One of the issues I raised was the raison d'être of building a fence round the university when lecturers and students were in dire need of offices, lecture halls, and a well-equipped library and more.

How do you react to this point where you have been banned from entering the university campus?

It is a primitive act. That destroys the possibilities of a discussion with the university authorities on the position they have taken. Their action shows how incapable they are to manage conflicts. It seems the are not strong enough to defend their actions.

Your termination has come barely a few weeks to the end of semester. What effect do you think it can have on your students?

It looks like the vice-chancellor is not interested in the progress of students at all. This is so because my courses and the students I supervise shall be unable to continue their studies. These students are bound to suffer the decision. You can't imagine someone with a decent academic culture accepting to teach a course in two weeks for which he is not prepared and give a continuous assessment and an exam.

You are from Germany, did you face similar problems of this nature?

Of course not. I have never witnessed accusations and letters of this nature. In democratic nations all over the world, freedom of speech is seen as fundamental in democracy.

You were accused of denigrating the head of state and the entire Cameroon nation?

I think the Vice-chancellor has to prove that. If my intellectual approach and view of issues is regarded as such, I think it is not out or question that I might seek for a legal redress.

What do you envisage as a way forward for the Buea University?

It is important to mention here that as it has happened to me today, it can also happen to anyone else tomorrow. I think, it is important for lecturers and students to fight for a real University in Buea because I am only the latest case in a long list of academic repression. I am afraid that if nothing is done immediately to redress the situation more repression than academics shall triumph.

Can you briefly introduce yourself?

I am a researcher and consultant in social and economic studies and in analysis of the development in Central Africa.
Repression in the academic field is to be expected in dictatorial societies. Most European and North-American will not be surprised to hear that lecturers of African Universities are expelled or punished for criticising the authorities. They believe that freedom of expression exists not even on the paper and that critical thinkers are executed directly or tortured to death by the administrating cannibals. In Cameroon the situation is much different. According to the Presidential-Decree No. 93/034 the objectives of the Buea University are "to encourage the advancement of learning and to hold out to all persons without distinction of origin, creed, sex or political conviction the opportunity of having a liberal education". Everybody who ever visited this glorified University knows that this is not a camouflage for a rude dictatorship but celebrated reality. But not all lecturers are so lucky to teach in Buea, so the question arises: How can academics work within a system of repression?

It is said that two ideal ways exist: If you have to join them, run with the pack. If you have a chance to avoid them, rest in peace. But as the proverb says "only dead fishes swim with the tide": Either one is already dead from the neck up or has to behave as such till the serious atrophy of the unused brain delivers one from criticism, or one gloats over the others' distress.

The movie "The Dead Poets' Society" by Peter Weir (1989), examines a young dynamic teacher who tries to promote critical thinking among the students of a totalitarian upper-class boarding-school. "Carpe diem, boys! Gather ye rosebuds while ye may! Make something special out of your lives!" With such statements, supported by an unorthodox and interesting form of teaching and inspiring articles in the local newspaper, the young teacher Dr. Iak Keating provokes creativity and revives his students' brains, which have been declared dead by the authorities. The fresh wind of resistance against the rude dictatorship of the administration leads to conflicts and culminates in the attempt of the administration to link the activities of the critical student organisation (Dead Poets' Society) to the "subversive influence" of Dr. Keating. "You incited students and staff of our institution to violence through your barrage of insulting and tendentious newspaper articles and lectures." The administration questioned the critical students one by one and offered them a chance to graduate: If they sign a letter of apology to the authorities, which accuses Dr. Keating of inciting them with heretical ideals, such as freedom, democracy, they are allowed to stay. If they refuse, they have to go, because "we find such impudence, calumny and subversion most unacceptable" - as the administration stated in a letter. Only one student resisted and was expelled, while the majority were afraid to fight for their freedom, because parents, teachers and job prospects do not promote critical thinking. Dr. Keating also refrains from fighting. He is satisfied when some students send him off with a gesture of solidarity. "Thank you, boys!" Henry A. Giroux criticised in his book Living Dangerously: Multiculturalism and the Politics of Difference (New York 1993), that Dr. Keating's lack of courage to stand for his beliefs disperses the willingness to fight for freedom, democracy and better education among the students. Resistance, betrayal and suppression are overshadowed by a trifling polite phrase. Dr. Keating as well as his students are prisoners of social constraints, which punish each attempt of deviancy, but Dr. Keating is guilty. He incited the students to
search for the world outside, but failed to break down his own walls of ignorance. "Run with the pack or find for you and your family a job in utopia" a man from the administration said in an informal interrogation. "Stop writing or you will have an accident. The administration kills its enemies. They have killed before." Dr. Keating wanted to fight, but his wife, his friends and the social constraints forced him to submit to the administration. Dictators had always assumed that opposition never ever changes anything, but has to be seen as a short interruption in the everlasting system of tradition, canonical knowledge and authority, and their assumption seems to be borne out by the reality. But is there really no alternative to Dr. Keating's decision to eat humble pie?

Roger Simon uses the dilemma of Dr. Keating to outline his attempt of "Teaching against the grain" (New York 1992). Simon changed the depressive end of the "Dead Poets' Society" to a revolutionary Lehrstück in the tradition of Bert Brecht. It has to be seen as one form of academic courage in a dictatorial system, so it is worth to be documented here:

"L’administration has answered the final question of my article "Civil Society" without even listening to it. In my keynote address at the celebration of the 6th anniversary of the Dead Poets' Society, which put l’administration on the run, I expounded that the walls of ignorance will fall, either by sense or by violence and that it is up to you to choose your option.

L’administration went amok. Defending her system of repression, l’administration sent me a rude letter full of unproved accusations and banned me from campus. But l’administration did not realise that times have changed. L’administration wants to slaughter each attempt for an open and productive discussion, like it was common in the times l’administration got her political training. I presume 20 years ago the government would have been silly enough to kick somebody like me out of the country, but in contrast to l’administration the government has learnt its lessons. If you ban the expression of creative and critical thinking you produce violence. This violence arises from the silent inner strife of men, which is produced by dictators and their creatures. L’administration can foil a strike of students and lecturers with her formalistic weapons and her informers, but l’administration gives rise to violence. L’administration is in a position to ban discussions and thinking on campus, but l’administration creates the people who will break down her walls of ignorance.

L’administration is producing violence inside the students and lecturers. This violence will not stop inside the walls of ignorance, but effect the outside world, which already practices concepts of conflict management. While the government split the Scottish opposition by supporting the concealed tribal superciliousness through the introduction of freedom of expression, l’administration undressed herself to unite the democratic opposition. The rude dictatorship under academic robes - which is now visible for the public - will generate an academic movement to create a academia, where there is currently only a glorified nursery school. All enemies of the government and supporters of academics should pay tribute to l’administration, because stupid self-adopted dictatorship generates its own gravedigger under a superficial silence. It is this silence which prevails on campus and precedes the storm of change.
L’administration accused me of denigrating “the authorities, including the Head of State, the entire nation of Britain and the boarding-school.” I would call my attempt critique, because in contrast to l’administration I argued for my position with reasons and not with power. One of the founding fathers of sociology pointed out that “criticism is not a passion of the head but the head of passion”, and I think he was right. If I criticised certain phenomena I did so not with the intention of weakening the civil society, but of supporting it. That is the difference between l’administration and me. I inspected and criticised problems within society as a contribution to an open discussion, which is the only way to improve the civil society, while l’administration never ever tries to discuss her problems. L’administration was afraid to discuss in public so l’administration had to denigrate and ban me. That is neither an academic nor a political form of discussion. On the contrary, it is an approach reminiscent of outdated totalitarian bureaucrats.

L’administration states that “we find such impudence, calumny and subversion most unacceptable”. It is a very interesting and significant phenomenon that dictators like to hide behind an undefined “We”. Who is “We”? Even foolish underlings only agree with l’administration, because she represents the power their existence is based on. If the power says “dimwit lecture naked”, they will do, and when the power said “you lecture the course of Dr. Iak Keating”, one went for it. These intellectual zombies can neither speak, nor think, nor argue and they turn into dust when they have to stand for their actions in the public. They rely on the dictatorial power and hide behind an illusive “We” and walls of ignorance. They suck the blood of the people and hate the sunshine of open discussions like vampires. To kill a vampire a peg and a hammer are required, but it is much easier to kill zombies. Take them for what they are: fools in their cage. Laugh at them whenever you see them. Ignore their orders, but pay lip-services if they force you to do so. It does not make any sense to argue with a fool and I can only feel compassion for these creatures. How can an intelligent human being be annoyed with people, who always make fools out of themselves like l’administration and her toadies? That’s life. Each sphere of their “society must be depicted as the partie honteuse of that society and these petrified conditions must be made to dance by having their own tune sung to them!”

If I would have been allowed to enter the campus, I would have seen l’administration to thank her for her letter. I pinned it to my wall as a certificate of academic excellency. Which scholar of international academic reputation was never expelled from a dictatorial campus? The academic ‘légion d’honneur’ is a legion of people, who were and are accused of denigrating unreasoned authority. I have to thank l’administration for her impression that I am already critical and creative enough to join this légion. Je ne regrette rien."
Cultural and Historical Facts about the Mt. Cameroon Region

Buea a Bakweri-town

The origin of the Bakweris, who are the indigenous inhabitants of the Mt. Cameroon region, is unknown. They are, next to the Duala, the second largest ethnic group among the Western Bantu speaking people. Nearly all people in Central Africa speak a language from the Western Bantu language family, but there are some quite significant differences between them. Western Bantu people entered the rainforest of the Congo-basin from the Cross River-region. They moved to the east and to the south, if the space for hunting, gathering and subsistence (less-intensive) farming became limited at their places of origin. The people in the Mt. Cameroon region call themselves "Mokpe" or "Monta Mokpe", which means "a person of Kpe". Their closest relatives are the Bomboko people. According to social scientists they have been living around the Mount Cameroon for at least 4000 years and they are the real Bakweris.

Today, there are 85 Bakweri villages of various sizes, most on an altitude between 500 and 1000 m above sea level. This is due to the fact that the Germans pushed coastal Bakweri villages up the mountain, when they transformed the rainforest around the Mt. Cameroon to plantation land. The Buea of today has a long history. According to traditional records it was founded as Gbea by Eeye Njie, a hunter from the Bomboko tribe. He discovered a large variety of animals at the Mosole river. So he started to build a small shelter and after some time he and his family settled down somewhere between Upper Farm and the Schloss, while his brother Nakande founded Bonakanda. Eeye Njie first called the location "Ligbea", which means the place of work, and later, the name was changed to Gbea when the place became a real village. The Buea of today is formed out of different villages: Buea, Soppo and Molyko.

Traditional Bakweri villages were small and fenced. If the population was growing, so that the space inside the fence (ngao) was all occupied by family members, they divided the village into two or three sections, called Upper (lelu) Middle (teni) and Lower (mbenge). Because most villages were occupied by only one family, there was no need for a strong political authority. The elders gave executive orders and judged in cases of dispute. There is even no word for chief in Bakweri. The word Sang’a Mboa, which is used today for the chief, originally means king of the bees. The position of village heads is a European creation: The Germans and the British installed even the position of a Paramount-Chief as an intermediary in their system of indirect rule. After independence, these so called traditional rulers were and are still being used in the same way and they are even paid by the ruling party in Cameroon. Social organisation among the Bakweris is traditionally strongly based on the various secret societies. The most important groups for men are Male and Nganya, while women organise themselves in the Liengu and Malova (Maloa) secret societies.

Male - Male is a word of Bakundu origin and means medicine and tree. It is said that the founder of Male was Lisongo Mwete, a trouble maker from Balundu, who had hidden himself in the forest for more than twenty years after a serious crime.
One day he had a dream: He saw a man called Mosongo na Njonge, who ordered him to construct a small drum out of wood, which he should play at the fire place in a dress made from palm-fronds.” Some elders from Lisongo Mwete’s village discovered him in the forest, joint his cult and started it as a secret society. There are four stages or classes of membership: Lova, Venjuka, Tamba, Vekpa. Any member who likes to be initiated to a higher level has to pay a fee (drinks and pigs). Once an individual climbs to a higher stage, he is taught the mystical rites known only by group members. Members of the highest class (Vakpa) claim to have supernatural power: The members believe that they are able to transform themselves into an elephant (Njoku) and to transport themselves from one place to another at a great speed (about 50 km per hour). The negative effect of the twin relation with an elephant lies in the responsibility of the man-part, when his animal-part causes damage to farms, because the man-part has to “pay”. It is said that the man-part will die if the elephant is killed, so Bakweri elephant-hunters have to crosscheck if an elephant has a man-part or not before shouting. In February and March, the various male associations hold public ceremonial dances. Each member must take an oath never to disclose the secrets of the association to anybody, even at gunpoint.

Malova - The Malova, a women’s secret society, is closely linked to the Male. It exists only in villages which have a Male and the organisation of the group is quite similar to the one of the Male. The main difference is that Malova-ladies do not have an elephant double, but a wild pig twin (Ngoa Wanga).

Nganya - This secret society provokes the villagers by dancing and singing around the houses at night. It has quite an important socio-cultural function, because during this procession, members are able to express their anger and their problems. Even if you do not believe in super-mystical power, it is quite obvious that the Nganya has the potential to trace and destroy evil spirits through naming them.

Liengu - The Liengu secret society is a women’s organisation, which was organised in the old days as rites of passage for girls on their way to becoming women and to prepare them for marriage. In isolation from public life, older ladies taught the girls medical and other rituals to manage their lives. It is quite important to notice that there is no clitoridectomy-rite among the Bakweris. Because of the modern educational system, the Liengu-society has lost its dominant position for the village women. It is nowadays more a society of reciprocal help - a Njangi-club.

Most of these secret societies are still very active even among the youths, but due to the modernisation of society they are gradually losing their dominant status within the villages. A good example of the change is the health system: While elders still go first to the traditional doctor (Nganga, witchcraft-man) to solve their health problems before they see a medical doctor (and this only if the first treatment does not help), the youths generally only visit a traditional doctor if the medical doctor seems unable to help them.

Another example of the ongoing tradition can be seen in the fact that most unexpected deaths are followed by an accusation of witchcraft. Even in obvious cases of AIDS or malaria etc., the families tend to accuse someone of witchcraft and to be responsible for the death. Traditionally, an accused person was
compelled to drink a concoction of sasswood (the bark of a tree). If the accused person vomited it, he was declared innocent, but if he failed to vomit, he was killed. Nowadays mob-rule seems to effect accused people directly if enough people believe in the accusation. It is still common to stone people to death if they are accused of witchcraft.

Traditionally, the Bakweris were neither traders nor handicraftsmen. Most of the craft which you can find on Buea markets is imported from other tribes. They earn their living by hunting, gathering and subsistence (low-intensive) farming in the forest. Even nowadays, when most families have somebody who works in the administration or another modern profession, they also continue with traditional forms of income generation. You can see the small farms all along the tracks up the mountain. While the hunter villages near the major towns like Tamba Wulule are not used any longer, Viambi, Vikele, Munsingeli and Nitele are still used as camps by local hunters.

**Efasah Moto** - Efasah Moto, who is only half-man (some say, the other half is animal, some say it is stone...), is the god of Mt. Cameroon. It is believed that he takes of the people up the mountain by providing water, food and shelter to the mountainers and hunters during their journey. The only condition is that the visitors are only allowed to harvest what they can consume and enjoy during their stay - and they are not allowed to carry anything that has been provided by Efasah Moto down. The belief in Efasah Moto is an interesting cultural link to ecotourism and the sustainability of resource use.

**The German Buea**

At the Congo-conference in Berlin 1884/85, Africa was divided between European nations. The colonial masters decided that Cameroon should be a colony of the German empire. A search for suitable locations of the German colonial administration started immediately after the annexation, because Douala, the town where the Germans started their administration, was one of the famous ‘white men's graves’. Of 50 Germans who started to run the colony in 1885, 35 died in the first year. Jesko von Puttkamer (from 1885-1895 chancellor and from 1895-1906 governor of German Cameroon) advocated the idea of basing the administration on the slopes of Mt. Cameroon. After numerous visits to the plantation of Monte Cafe on Sao Tomé, which is located at an altitude of 900m above sea level, he recognised the advantages of a mountainous location for the health of Europeans in tropical Africa. But at the time he became the leading administrator of the German colony, the power of the colonists ended some hundred meters inland, just as far as their weapons could reach. Neither a station of the Basel-Mission in Buea, which was founded in 1896, nor the fact that Germany bought the Buea region in 1887 for 800 Mark - “a jar of brandy”- changed anything in the ongoing conflict between the Bakweris and the Germans. On December 5th, 1891 the Bakweris attacked a reconnaissance troop and killed the leader, Freiherr von Gravenreuth, at a bridge over the ravine, which is located immediately in front of today's Mountain Hotel. Fear of more encroachments forced the German troops to flee over the mountain to Victoria (Limbe). Before they left, they buried their leader, but took the head and the heart along. This procedure led to confusion: While the Germans thought it would be better to take head and heart
along to save the sole of Gravenreuth, even nowadays Bakweri suspect a form of cannibalism behind this behaviour: heart and head have been taken along as food for the journey. However by 1894 Buea was definitely ‘pacified’ and, in the following year, the first buildings were set up to take the German colonial administration. Unfortunately these buildings served later as firewood. While these first buildings were delivered completely in finished parts from Europe, Jesko von Puttkamer started a solid building boom in Buea.

The castle of Puttkamer
The construction of the 'Schloss', as it is still called today, was started in 1900 as the residence of the governor. The German constructors copied the architecture of a Wilhelminian hunting lodge in Brandenburg/Germany. The completion was delayed since they could only work during the short dry season. It was solemnly opened on June 1st, 1902. Even though most items and furniture have disappeared, there are still some glasses and plates from the German time. A painting portraying Graf Moltke, the German foreign minister at that time, still decorates one of the numerous open fireplaces. In 1916 British troops took Buea. In 1919 the League of Nations decided to give western Cameroon to the British; of course again without asking the Cameroonians. From 1919 till 1960 the representative of British Nigeria lived in the Schloss, which was called the Governor's lodge at that time. After independence the Prime Ministers of West Cameroon, Foncha, Jua and Muna lived there until Cameroon was declared a United Republic in 1972. Officially it is the residence of the President of Cameroon when he comes to the South West Province, but it has not been used since 1972. The German Embassy in Yaoundé is trying to transform the 'Schloss' into a museum, but at the moment it is not possible for tourists to visit it.

A botanical garden, which was created around the 'Schloss' by Dr. Max Esser, who also established the botanical garden in Limbe, no longer exists. Nobody maintains it today, but Puttkamer claimed that at his time 50 different kind of roses were blooming on the different terraces of the garden.

The Secretariat
This building was completed 1902 as the head office of administration in German Cameroon. The clock-tower and a door on which "Adjutant und Melde" is written are interesting traces of the German time. When the British took over the colony, all files, documents and books were simply thrown into the attic, where they were found by Edwin Ardener, the most important historian of Southwest Cameroon, in 1961. You find them today two houses further uphill, in the Buea Public Archive.

The Building School
The building school was built to train local craftsmen how to construct administrative buildings. It is a good example of German colonial architecture: Apparently the walls have turned out a little too solid. In 1970 the Cameroon government wanted to build a modern building for their police forces right at that spot, but they were unable to blast it, because this building consists of 30 cm of thick poured concrete walls. They gave up and constructed a new building on the left side of the building school, which is already falling apart today.
The Bismarck-Fountain
The fountain was planned and constructed in 1898 in honour of Otto von Bismarck, who was the German chancellor when Germany became a colonial power. There is a similar fountain in Atakampe (Togo), so it seems as if the construction of this fountain was ordered directly from government authorities in Berlin. Recently the German embassy in Yaoundé was sent an application by the ‘Association of the Friends of Archives and Antiquities - Cameroon’ to help to restore the fountain. There might be the chance that in some years, you can tap your water there again and that the place becomes a common meeting spot for the inhabitants of Buea. The old German Post Office, which dates from the first building phase of 1895, lies on the left side of the fountain. The German Post Office is a prefabricated building, which was assembled in Cameroon. Thick oak boards are hidden under the zinc walls. Till independence in 1960, this building was used by the British, but the typical British red mailbox which looks like new, is not operating any longer.

The German Cemetery
The main German graveyard, where the victims of malaria and typhoid fever, who could still drag themselves to the army hospital at Soppo, were buried, was destroyed in favour of the tea-plantations. But a small German cemetery behind the Mobil filling station was rediscovered some years ago; where administrative employees and plantation owners' children were buried. The oldest graves are those of two bricklayers, Elbershausen and Jankowski, who died during the construction of the first buildings in Buea in 1898. The youngest German grave dates from 1938, when Hans Bettermann, the son of a tea planter, died. In 1957 the child of the British planter Funnell was buried at the same place - the only non-German grave.

Joseph Kerner who died in 1911, even has two gravestones. One day, when he was completely drunk he shot the senior officers Biernatzyk and Gniss and wounded the officers Nagel and Schnaebele, before shooting himself. His relatives blamed the traumatic tropics for this fatal drama and sent a splendid gravestone to Buea. Nobody knows where he is buried, but two gravestones remind the visitors about the tragedy of his death.

The Upper Farm
In 1899, Puttkamer gave the order to build a modern farm above Buea. Even cows from the German mountains prospered at this altitude. As late as the early sixties, the United Nation administrators, who supervised the independence process, fetched the milk for their early morning tea there. But nowadays there are no cows above Buea any longer, because Cameroonians are not very keen on fresh milk. Today, the upper farm is a prison, but it also offers a small bar where tourists can relax.
Once up to Mont Fako is more than enough!

The history of mountain-climbing on Mt. Cameroon

Between 1899 and 1954 many people left complaints in the visitors-book, which was available at hut 3, saying, that once up the 4070 m high Fako, was more than enough. But most negative statements were written down during the rainy season. Even if the rainy season offers a beautiful view of the rainforest to the north and of the islands of Bioko, Sao Tome and Principe to the south of Mt. Fako it is wise for tourists to hike only during the dry-season up the highest mountain of West-Africa. Impenetrable fog masses veil the mountain the rest of the year or the dusty north wind forces professional photographers with its diffuse light to commit suicide - so at least a guidebook suggests.

The history of mountain-climbing on Mt. Cameroon is closely linked to German colonial administration between 1884 and 1916. In 1897, the German mountaineering-organisation built three shelters on the 'Guinness-route', which is the direct connection between Buea and the summit: The Musake-Hut (1870m) at the spring of the river Musake, the Johann-Albrechts-Hut (2780m) and the Herzogen-Elisabeth-Hut (3950m), which are nowadays known as huts 1, 2 and 3. This fast, but scenically dull trail was first used in February 1895 by the German navy captain Witschel and the medical officer Ziemann. Mary Kingsley, the famous female explorer, used this route to become the first European woman to reach the peak in the same year.

The history of European climbing on Mt. Cameroon started in 1858, when Baptist missionaries under Alfred Saker founded the first European settlement in the region: Victoria (today Limbe). In December 1861, an expedition under Richard Burton, the famous British explorer of Central-Africa, and the German biologist Gustav Mann started in Victoria to climb Mt. Cameroon. On this tour, Mann 'discovered' the Mann-spring at an altitude of 2260m. It was quite common in colonial times that Europeans had the idea that they were the original discoverers of the whole territory, even though the local people had known a place for hundreds of years already. Mann-spring for example, has been used by the Bakweri hunters of this region for a long time. However, today it is a beautiful resting place on the reopened old route up the mountain. From here the new route joins the same track the early explorers used, having started all their climbing attempts from Mapanja. Between 1890 and 1905, two Swedish farmers tried to establish a farm around Mann-spring. They moved up and down to Bokwango by horse and donkey. It is still possible to see the foundations of their houses, even though they had abandoned their experiment in 1905 because Bakweri hunters did not hesitate before killing their cattle. In the last years of their stay at Mann-spring, they started a private war with the Bakweri hunters and they even killed some of them, but finally the Bakweri succeeded and the Swedes left. At half past one on December 27th, 1861 Richard Burton reached the summit of Mt. Fako. Alone, because - according to his own records - all the porters were too tired to join him on the summit. But he was not a skilled mountaineer, because on the way back to Mann-spring he got blisters, and had to be carried back to Victoria. On January 3rd, 1862 Gustav Mann, together with the Spanish judge Calvo, reached the summit. After a longer break in Victoria, Burton and Mann climbed to the peak again at the end of January 1862, this time however not as mountaineers but as colonialists. Richard
Burton erected the British flag as leader of the expedition on a brittle rock and declared the mountain property of the English crown - to the astonishment of his bearers. This strange behaviour and the fact that he did not pay his guides and bearers, because he thought they were too expensive, lead to a general halt to climbing attempts, because the Bakweri refused to allow any European to use their hunting-tracks. It was another 15 years before the next person, the Baptist-missionary Comber, was able to reach the summit in 1877. In 1879, the anthropologist Flegel reached the summit. He was the first person who described the landscape, while all earlier descriptions were centred around the sportive and political aspects of climbing. Flegel was also the first European who described hunters villages in the savannah. The first tourist, who reached the summit was the journalist Hugo Zöllner who wrote for a Cologne newspaper in 1884. With his thrilling account (Journey in the Cameroon area), which is still very well worth reading today, he contributed to the rush up the mountain, which still goes on nowadays.
This paper was submitted as an abstract for the CODESRIA-Conference ‘Social Sciences and Globalisation in Africa’; 14th - 18th Dec. 1998 in Dakar.

This article was submitted as a contribution to the first issue of the Journal for Applied Social Sciences in summer 1998, but it was banned by the administration of the University of Buea, when the journal was already in print.


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- By nature, all men, whether Barbarians or Greeks, are in every respect equal. From this it can be deduced what all men need from nature. All men have an equally good chance of realising their destiny; in this respect, there exists no difference between either Barbarians or Greeks and us. Why? Because we all breath air in and out through our mouths and noses; and we all eat with our hands. (Antiphon; in Capelle, Wilhelm, The pre-Socratic dialogues, Berlin/DDR 1961; p. 377).

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Döllinger, Irene; Individuum und Kultur (Individual and Culture); Berlin/DDR 1986; p.197/198.

MEW 2.38.

MEW 2.127.

MEW 3.28.

MEW 42.27.

Hacks, Peter; Essays; Leipzig 1983; p.219/220.

MEW 23.597.

MEW 34.371.

- If one accepts that production fulfills the external needs related to the object of consumption, then one must also accept that consumption determines the object of production, as mental image, as need, as desire, and as ultimate goal. It creates the object of production in a more subjective form. Without need, there can be no production. But consumption is the mirror image of need." (MEW 42.27)

Concerning the decline of the Roman Empire, Marx and Engels said that to barbarian peoples, war itself is still a normal way of dealing with other
people, and occurs more frequently as the group evolves. It is also the only available means of production. (cf. MEW 3,23)

30 "Our needs and pleasures are rooted in society. Society is our yardstick for them - and we measure them according to the degree of satisfaction they bring us. Because they naturally occur in society, they are related to society." (MEW 6,412)

31 "Basic human needs themselves, such as food, clothing, heat, shelter, etc. vary according to the climatic and other natural characteristics of a given country. However, both the number of needs considered to be basic, as well as the ways in which these are satisfied, are actually a product of history and are determined for the most part by the cultural level of the country, as well as by the general conditions and thus the customs and aspirations that have developed among the working class." (MEW 23,185) "Workers need time to satisfy their intellectual, spiritual and social needs, the nature and extent of which are determined by the general cultural atmosphere." (MEW 23,246)

32 Döbler, Martin; Triebrkraft Bedürfnis (The Driving Force of Needs); Berlin/DDR 1969; p.59.

33 Steitz, Lilo (Ed.); Bedürfnisse und Interessen als Triebkräfte unseres Handelns (Needs and Interests as the Driving Forces of Human Action); Berlin/DDR 1984; p.7.

34 Gaziets, Seev; Menschliche Bedürfnisse - Eine theoretische Synthese (Human Needs - a theoretical Synthesis); Frankfurt/Main 1981; p.10.

35 MEW 42,512.

36 MEW 23,193.

37 Holzkamp, Klaus; Grundlegung der Psychologie (Foundation of Psychology); Frankfurt/Main 1985; p.243.

38 Weiss, Peter; Ästhetik des Widerstands (The Aesthetics of Resistance); Frankfurt/Main 1988; Vol. 1: p.351.

39 Stirner, Max; The ego and his own - The case of the individual against authority; New York 1963.

40 MEW 40,548.

41 cf. Schmidt-Soltan, Kai; Chad: Demise of a nation or Rebirth of Freedom? (Der Tschad: Ende der Staaten - Anfang der Freiheit?); in: Lettre international No. 32 (Spring 1996); p.62-63.


43 cf.: Foucault, Michel; The microphysics of power; Berlin 1976.

44 Pink Floyd; The dogs of war; London 1987.

45 Marx opposes in this passage quoted by Engels in 1890 (MEW 22, 69) an interpretation of his work rampant in France in the 70s of the last century that was characterised by "einerseits durch starkes Mißverständnis der Anschauungsweise, die man zu vertreten behauptete, anderseits durch grobe Unkenntnisschaft mit den jedesmal entscheidenden historischen Tatsachen, dritterseits durch das den deutschen Literaten so vorteilhaft auszeichnende Bewußtsein der eignen unermüdlichen Überlegenheit." (MEW 22,69)

46 MEW 19, 530.

47 The term Marxism is used for the totality of interpretations of Marx that first regard themselves as Marxists and second referred to the self appointed then existing socialist countries in some sympathetic way.

48 A number of studies is trying to prove the contrary, making Marx the main defendant, whose ghost is still bringing chaos and anarchy into a peace-loving world. Cf. for example: Genisch, Lutz; Realsozialismus und Karl Marx – Die Stalinismus-Legende; Frankfurt/Main 1992.

49 "Kommunistische Parteien sind heute in der Krise - nicht nur in der BRD. Die Krise der Parteien ist nicht eine Krise des Marxismus, der seine theoretische Kraft nicht zuletzt darin bewiesen hat, daß mehr und mehr auch die bürgerliche Wissenschaft von Denkmodellen und Einzeleinsichten marxistischer Forschung Gebrauch macht und sie in sich integriert, ohne allerdings das System im ganzen und seine weltanschaulichen Konsequenzen zu akzeptieren." (Holz, Hans Heinz; Niederlage und Zukunft des Sozialismus; Essen 1991; p.7)

50 MEW 1, 385.


52 MEGA II 6,709; engl.: MEGA II 9,27.
... die festen Gedanken in Flüssigkeit zu bringen als das sinnliche Dasein. (...) Die Gedanken werden flüssig, indem das reine Denken, diese innere Unmittelbarkeit, sich als Moment erkennt oder indem die reine Gewißheit seiner selbst von sich abschafft; - nicht sichwegläßt, auf die Seite setzt, sondern das Fixe ihres Sichselbstsetzen aufgibt, sowohl das Fixe des reinen Konkreten, welches Ich selbst im Gegensatz gegebeneinanderen Inhalt ist, - als das Fixe von Unterschieden, die im Elemente des reinen Denkens gesetzt an jener Unbedingtheit des Ich Anteil haben. Durch diese Begewung werden die reinen Gedanken Begriffe, und sind erst, was sie in Wahrheit sind, Selbstbewegungen, Kreise, das, was ihre Substanz ist, geistige Wesenheiten.“ (Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Phänomenologie des Geistes; Hamburg 1988; Vorrede, p.27)

In 1858 – after a second reading of Hegel’s logic – Marx wrote to Engels: "Wenn je wieder Zeit für solche Arbeiten kommt, hätte ich große Lust, in 2 oder 3 Druckbogen das Rationalle an der Methode, die Hegel entdeckte, aber zugleich mystifiziert hat, dem gemeinen Menschenverstand zugänglich zu machen.“ (MEW 29,260) Ten years later it still didn’t seem to be the time and so he wrote to Joseph Dietzgen: "Wenn ich die ökonomische Last abgeschüttelt, werde ich eine freie Zeit für solche Arbeiten haben.“ (MEW 32,547)

“Diese Kategorien, die nur instinktiv als Triebe wirksam sind und zunächst vereinzelt, damit veränderlich und sich verwirrend in das Bewußtsein des Geistes gebracht und ihm so eine vereinzelte und unsichere Wirklichkeit gewähren, zu reinigen und ihn damit in ihnen zur Freiheit und Wahrheit zu erheben, dies ist also das höhere logische Geschäft.“ (Hegel, G.W.F.; Wissenschaft der Logik - Die Lehre vom Sein (1832); Hamburg 1990; Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage, p.17) “Das dialektische Moment ist das eigene Sichauflählen solcher endlichen Bestimmungen und ihr Ubergehen in ihre entgegengesetzte. (...) Das Dialektische macht daher die bewegende Seele des wissenschaftlichen Fortgehens aus und ist das Prinzip, wodurch allein immanenter Zusammenhang und Notwendigkeit in den Inhalt der Wissenschaft kommt, so wie in ihm überhaupt die wahrhafte, nicht äußerliche Erhebung über das Endliche liegt.“ (d.ers.; Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830); Hamburg 1991; §81 p.102/103)

58 While Marx in his advance work to his dissertation (1839) appeared to be a "dogmatic" hegelian ("Tod und Liebe sind die Mythe von der negativen Dialektik, denn die Dialektik ist das innre einfache Licht, das durchdringende Auge der Liebe, die innre Seele, die nicht erdrückt wird durch den Leib der materialischen Zerspaltung, der innre Ort des Geistes. Der Mythus von ihr ist so die Liebe; aber die Dialektik ist auch der reissende Strom, der die Vielen und ihre Grenze zerbricht, der die selbstständigen Gestalten umwirft, alles inabsehend in das eine Meer der Ewigkeit. Der Mythus von ihr ist dafür der Tod.“ MEGA IV 1,106), he left the hegelian dialectics 1844 at the latest under the impression of the "Young Hegelians”. "Aber wer hat denn das Geheimnis des Systems aufgedeckt! Feuerbach. Wer hat die Dialektik der Begriffe, den Götterkrieg, den die Philosophen allein kannten, vernichtet? Feuerbach." (MEW 2,98) Haug is right to ask: "Was tritt an die Stelle der Dialektik der Begriffe? (...) Aber worin liegt der Unterschied zu Hegel?“ (HKWM; 2,663) A question with many attempts to answer it, though none of these attempted answers seem sufficient to me. So this forms one condition that underlines – next to other factors – the necessity for a new interpretation of Marx’ work.

59 Wright, Erik O./ Levine, Andrew/ Sober, Elliott; Reconstructing Marxism – Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History; London 1992; p.6. Wright et al. seem to want, together with Phillippe van Parijs (Marxism Recycled; Cambridge 1993), to put an end to the discussion that was started by Gerald Allan Cohen (Karl Marx’s Theory of History – A Defence; Princeton 1978). Its best theoretical version was John Elster’s work "Making Sense of Marx“ (Cambridge 1985), in which he showed three levels of Marx’ definition of dialectics: “I shall discuss three strands of Hegelian reasoning in Marx, each of which has a claim to be called, if not the dialectical method, at least a dialectical method. The first is the quasideductive procedure used in central parts of the Grundrisse and in the opening chapters of Capital 1, inspired above all by Hegel's Logic. The second is the dialectic as codified by Engels, including the 'laws' of the negation of the negation and of the transformation of quantity into quality. The third is a theory of social contradictions, derived largely from the Phenomenology of Spirit. I shall argue that of these, the first is barely intelligible; the second has a certain, although somewhat limited interest; while the third emerges as an important tool for the theory of social change."” (Elster 1985; p.37) Cf.: Diederich, Werner; Marx-Renaissance im Westen? Ein

MEGA II 6,709; eng.: MEGA II 9,24.

Haug; HKWM 2,665. "Marx benutzt Hegelsche Kategorien als operative Begriffe, ohne sich um ihren (onto-)logischen Status - der bei Hegel ja die Voraussetzung ihres methodologischen Gebrauchs darstellt! - zu bekümmern." (Kallscheuer, Otto; Marxismus und Erkenntnistheorie in Westeuropa; Frankfurt/Main 1986; p.268)


MEW 32.686.

Feuerbach extents in his 'Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft' "the classical method of dialectical discourse by Heraklit, Plato, Aristotile, Kant, and Hegel in so far as he became aware of the fact that 'die wahre Dialektik kein Monolog des einsamen Denkers mit sich selbst (ist), sie ist ein Dialog zwischen Ich und Du.'" (Feuerbach, Ludwig; Anthropologischer Materialismus - Ausgewählte Schriften; Frankfurt/Main 1967; §62 Vol.1, p.156)

MEGA II 4.2,852; eng.: Marx, Karl; Capital - A critique of political economy; Moscow 1959; Vol.III, p.809. Dialectics therefore is used to decode being, which "innere(r) Zusammenhang endgültig zerrissen und (dessen) Quellen vollständig verschüttet (erscheinen), eben durch die Verselbständigung der an die verschiedenen stofflichen Elemente des Produktionsprozesses gebundenen, Produktionsverhältnisse gegeneinander." (MEW 25,838; MEGA II 4.2,852)

"Die klassische Ökonomie sucht die verschiednen fixen und einander fremden Formen des Reichtums durch Analyse auf ihre innre Einheit zurückzuführen und ihnen die Gestalt, worin sie als gegebenen Voraussetzungen ausgeht. (...) So hat sie alle Formen der Revenue und alle selbständigen Gestalten, Titel, unter denen an den Wert der Ware vom Nichtarbeiter partizipiert wird, auf die eine Form des Profits reduziert." (MEW 26.3,490/491) This method can be seen as practically applying Hegel's logical reduction. "Classical economy" did not have to be conscious of their drawing on Hegel to practice this method. In the contrary it is still to be checked in how far Hegel’s Logic is a substratum of "classical economy" – though it cannot be done in this work.

Marx goes on: 'Die Analyse aber die notwendige Voraussetzung der genetischen Darstellung, des Begreifens des wirklichen Gestaltungsprozesses in seinen verschiedenen Phasen. Die klassische Ökonomie fehlt endlich, ist mangelhaft, indem sie die Grundform des Kapitals, die auf Aneignung fremder Arbeit gerichtete Produktion nicht als Geschichtliche Form, sondern Naturform der gesellschaftlichen Produktion auffaßt, eine Auffassung, zu deren Beseitigung sie jedoch durch ihre Analyse selbst den Weg bahnt." (MEW 26.3,491)

"Alles gesellschaftliche Leben ist wesentlich praktisch. Alle Mysterien, welche die Theorie zum Mystizismus veranlassen, finden ihre rationale Lösung in der menschlichen Praxis und in dem Begreifen dieser Praxis." (Thesen über Feuerbach; MEW 3.7)

"Der Standpunkt des alten Materialismus ist die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, der Standpunkt des neuen die menschliche Gesellschaft oder die gesellschaftliche Menschheit." (Thesen über Feuerbach; MEW 3.7)


"Auf den Kredit Hegelscher Flausen, wie die Negation der Negation eine ist, möchte sich schwerlich ein besonnener Mann von der Notwendigkeit der Boden- und Kapitalkommunität überzeugen lassen (...). Die nebelhafte Zwittergestalt der Marx'schen Vorstellungen wird übrigens den nicht befremden, der da weiß, was mit der Hegel-Dialektik als wissenschaftlicher Grundlage gemeint werden kann oder vielmehr an Ungereimtheiten herauskommen muß. Für den Nichtkenner dieser
Künste ist ausdrücklich zu bemerken, daß die erste Negation bei Hegel der Katechismusbegriff des Sündenfalls, und die zweite derjenige einer zur Erlösung hinführenden höheren Einheit ist. Auf diese Analogieschneurze hin, die dem Gebiet der Religion entlehnt ist, möchte nun wohl die Logik der Tatsachen nicht zu gründen sein ...

Indem Marx also den Vorgang als Negation der Negation bezeichnet, denkt er nicht daran, ihn dadurch beweisen zu wollen als einen geschichtlich notwendigen. Im Gegenteil: Nachdem er geschichtlich bewiesen hat, daß der Vorgang in der Tat teils sich ereignet hat, teils noch sich ereignen muß, bezeichnet er ihn zudem als einen Vorgang, der sich nach einem bestimmten dialektischen Gesetz vollzieht. Das ist alles.” (MEW 20,125)

In the Aristotle’ Metaphysics he said, “daß (Platon) nun das Eine und die Zahlen neben die Dinge setzte (als von diesen getrennt), und nicht wie die Pythagoreer, und die Einführung der Ideen war begründet in dem fragenden Denken in Begriffen; denn die früheren hatten noch keinen Anteil an der Dialektik.” (Aristotle’s Metaphysics 987b; Hamburg 1989; Vol.1, p.40 resp. p.41)

“Der große Grundgedanke, daß die Welt nicht als ein Komplex von fertigen Dingen zu fassen ist, sondern als ein Komplex von Prozessen, worin die scheinbar stabilen Dinge nicht minder wie ihre Gedankenabbilder in unsern Kopf, die Begriffe eine ununterbrochene Veränderung des Werdens und Vergehens durchmachen, in der bei aller scheinbaren Zufälligkeit und trotz aller momentanen Rückläufigkeit schließlich eine fortschreitende Entwicklung sich durchsetzt - dieser große Grundgedanke ist, namentlich seit Hegel, so sehr in das gewöhnliche Bewußtsein übergegangen, daß er in dieser Allgemeinheit wohl kaum noch Widerspruch findet.” (MEW 21,293)

Cf. chapter 2.2.1. about the improvement of marxist understanding of dialectics and the good summary of Haug (HKWM; 2,669-692).

Marx himself understood his work as a uniform and dialectical urge for temporary truth. The works he published himself are naturally of more importance than those published posthumously. In 1865 he wrote in a letter to Engels. "Ich kann mich aber nicht entschließen, irgend etwas wegzuschicken, bevor das Ganze vor mir liegt. Whatever shortcomings they may have, das ist der Vorzug meiner Schriften, daß sie ein artistisches Ganzes sind, und das ist nur erreichbar mit meiner Weise, sie nie drucken zu lassen, bevor sie ganz vor mir liegen.” (MEW 31,132)
Zweitens aber ist es nun einmal nicht zu vermeiden, daß alles, was einen Menschen bewegt, den Durchgang durch seinen Kopf machen muß - sogar Essen und Trinken, das infolge von vermittelst des Kopfs empfundnem Hunger und Durst begonnen und infolge von ebenfalls vermittelst des Kopfs empfundnem Sättigung beendigt wird. Die Einwirkungen der Außenwelt auf den Menschen drücken sich in seinem Kopf aus, spiegeln sich darin als Gefühle, Gedanken, Triebe, Willensbestimmungen, kurz, als 'ideale Strömungen', und werden in dieser Gestalt zu 'idealen Mächten'." (MEW 21,281/282)

MEW 3, 5.

MEW 3, 5.

MEGA II 6,709.

Stalin develops in his "Grundlagen des Leninismus" self-criticism as the fourth and last principal of the "leninist method": "Viertens in der Selbstkritik der proletarischen Parteien, in ihrer Schulung und Erziehung an Hand der eigenen Fehler, denn nur so ist es möglich, wirkliche Kader und wirkliche Führer der Partei zu erziehen." (Stalin, J.W.; Fragen des Leninismus; Berlin/DDR 1951; p.19)

Under the title "Criticism and Self-Criticism" Shdanow even forms this element into a new dialectical "law": "In unserer Sowjetgesellschaft, in der die antagonistischen Klassen liquidiert sind, vollzieht sich der Kampf zwischen Altem und Neuem, und folglich die Entwicklung von Niederen zu Höherem nicht in Form des Kampfes antagonistischer Klassen und Kataklysmen, wie das im Kapitalismus der Fall ist, sondern in Form der Kritik und Selbstkritik, die die wirkliche Triebkraft unserer Entwicklung, das mächtige Instrument in den Händen der Partei ist. Das ist unbedingt eine neue Form der Bewegung, ein neuer Typ der Entwicklung, eine neue dialektische Gesetzmäßigkeit." (Shdanow, A.; Kritische Bemerkungen zu G.F. Alexandrows Buch: 'Geschichte der westeuropäischen Philosophie' - Rede auf der Philosophietagung in Moskau, Juni 1947; in: ders.; Über Kunst und Wissenschaft; Berlin/DDR 1951; p.19)

This for example becomes clear in the "Einleitung zu Marx' Klassenkämpfen in Frankreich", written by Engels shortly before his death in 1895: "Die Geschichte hat aber auch uns unrecht gegeben, hat unsere damalige Ansicht als eine Illusion enthüllt. Sie ist noch weiter gegangen: Sie hat nicht nur unseren damaligen Irrtum zerstört, sie hat auch die Bedingungen total umgewälzt, unter denen das Proletariat zu kämpfen hat. Die Kampfwese von 1848 ist heute in jeder Beziehung veraltet, und das ist ein Punkt, der bei dieser Gelegenheit näher untersucht zu werden verdient." (MEW 22,513)

"Regel geht vom Staat aus und macht den Menschen zum versubjektivierten Staat, die Demokratie geht vom Menschen aus und macht den Staat zum verobjektivierten Menschen. Wie die Demokratie nicht den Menschen, sondern wie der Mensch die Religion schafft, so schafft nicht die Verfassung das Volk, sondern das Volk die Verfassung. (...) So ist die Demokratie das Wesen aller Staatsverfassung, der sozialisierte Mensch, als eine besondere Staatsverfassung; sie verhält sich zu den übrigen Verfassungen, wie die Gattung sich zu ihren Arten verhält, nur daß hier die Gattung selbst als Existenz, darum gegenüber dem Wesen nicht entsprechenden Existenzen selbst als eine besondere Art erscheint. (...) Der Mensch ist nicht des Gesetzes, sondern das Gesetz ist des Menschen wegen da, es ist menschliches Dasein, während in den andern der Mensch das gesetzliche Dasein ist." (MEW 1,231)

"Die politische Emanzipation von der Religion ist nicht die durchgeführte, die widerspruchslose Emanzipation von der Religion, weil die politische Emanzipation nicht die durchgeführte, die widerspruchslose Weise der menschlichen Emanzipation ist." (MEW 1,353)

"Die politische Emanzipation von der Religion ist nicht die durchgeführte, die widerspruchslose Emanzipation von der Religion, weil die politische Emanzipation nicht die durchgeführte, die widerspruchslose Weise der menschlichen Emanzipation ist." (MEW 1,388)

This for example becomes clear in the "Einleitung zu Marx' Klassenkämpfen in Frankreich", written by Engels shortly before his death in 1895: "Die Geschichte hat aber auch uns unrecht gegeben, hat unsere damalige Ansicht als eine Illusion enthüllt. Sie ist noch weiter gegangen: Sie hat nicht nur unseren damaligen Irrtum zerstört, sie hat auch die Bedingungen total umgewälzt, unter denen das Proletariat zu kämpfen hat. Die Kampfwese von 1848 ist heute in jeder Beziehung veraltet, und das ist ein Punkt, der bei dieser Gelegenheit näher untersucht zu werden verdient." (MEW 22,513)
In the statutes of the First International of 1864 Marx develops this dialectical connection firmly and explicitly: "In Erwägung, daß die Emanzipation der Arbeiterklasse durch die Arbeiterklasse selbst erobert werden muß, daß der Kampf für die Emanzipation der Arbeiterklasse kein Kampf für Klassenvorrechte und Monopole ist, sondern für gleiche Rechte und Pflichten und für die Vernichtung aller Klassenherrschaft, daß die ökonomische Unterwerfung des Arbeiters unter den Aneigner der Arbeitsmittel, d.h. der Lebensquellen, der Knechtschaft in allen ihren Formen zugrunde liegt - allem gesellschaftlichen Elend, aller geistigen Verkümmerung und politischen Abhängigkeit; daß die ökonomische Emanzipation der Arbeiterklasse daher der große Endzweck ist, dem jede politische Bewegung, als Mittel, unterzuordnen ist." (MEW 16,14)